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The last decade has witnessed a profusion of commentary 
on “mind-reading” devices. Instead of offering traditional legal 
arguments against such devices, most scholars have simply 
assumed their use to be unconstitutional. The consensus is clear: 
by essentially “speaking for” defendants, mind-reading devices 
offend the basic spirit of the Self-Incrimination Clause. In this 
Article, I defend the constitutionality of mind-reading on both 
doctrinal and normative grounds. First, I reconstruct the Court’s 
self-incrimination jurisprudence to demonstrate that evidence is 
only “testimonial” — and thus, privileged — if it involves a 
“communicative act” from the suspect. Whether or not particular 
types of mind-reading devices would elicit “communicative acts” 
is a narrow, technology-specific question. And at least some mind-
reading devices almost certainly would not – making their use 
permissible under the Fifth Amendment. Second, I defend this 
doctrinal result against normative attack. Many different accounts 
of the privilege’s theoretical underpinnings exist. I evaluate these 
accounts in turn, arguing that some are inapposite to mind 
reading, while others fail in a deeper sense. 
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Suppose, some day in the not-too-distant future, that John 
Doe is the prime suspect in a murder investigation. In addition to 
compelling Doe to compose a voice recording,
1
 to submit a 
handwriting sample,
2
 and to turn over computer files
3
 — all par for 
the constitutional course — a judge also issues a warrant 
compelling Doe to sit for examination by a Mind Reader Machine, 
an invention that enables police to obtain detailed biometric and 
neurological information from Doe, which is then translated into a 
“read-out” of his mental states. Without requiring any cooperation 
on Doe’s part, the Machine will put his thoughts on full display. 
What would be the constitutional implications of this newfound 
practice?  
Imagined at such a high level of abstraction, the Mind 
Reader Machine is obviously a dramatization. But realistic 
analogues become more plausible by the day.
4
 We may not be far 
from a world in which brain-imaging technology will enable law 
enforcement to parse the thoughts of a silent criminal suspect, to 
retrieve the suspect’s memories, and to determine whether the 
suspect is lying.
5
 Many Fifth Amendment scholars find this a 
displeasing prospect. Departing from Justice Brennan’s famous 
observation about polygraph tests — “To compel a person to 
submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his 
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether 
                                                 
1
 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).  
2
 See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
3
 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36-37 (2000) (holding that the 
compelled disclosure of documents does not violate the privilege against self-
incrimination so long as the act of disclosure has no “testimonial aspect”); 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (holding that compelling 
production of tax documents from plaintiff’s attorney does not violate plaintiff’s 
right against self-incrimination).   
4
 For an excellent summary of the gradiant of relevant brain-imaging 
technologies, see Sarah E. Stoller & Paul R. Wolpe, Emerging 
Neurotechnologies for Lie Detection and the Fifth Amendment, 33 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 359, 360-64 (2007). See also Sean K. Thompson, A Brave New World of 
Interrogation Jurisprudence, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 341, 341-47 (2007); Matthew 
B. Holloway, Comment, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words, 27 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 141, 144-53 (2008). 
5
 See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 359-64 (outlining the science behind so-
called “Neurological Lie Detection” technologies). In fact, a similar technique 
has already been implemented in India. Dov Fox, The Right to Silence as 
Protecting Mental Control, 42 AKRON L. REV. 763, 765-67 (2009) (discussing 
the role that brain imaging played in a murder trial in 2008). See also Anand 
Giridharadas, India's Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is Debated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/world/asia/ 
15brainscan.html?pagewanted=all. 
3
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willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth 
Amendment”
6
 — these scholars argue that extracting cognitive 
evidence from an unwilling suspect would offend the Self-
Incrimination Clause to its pith. To rehearse but a few examples: 
Sarah Stoller and Paul Wolpe find the Machine “a chilling 
concept”;
7
 Nita Farahany believes the Machine to violate basic 
“intuitions about mental privacy and autonomy of self”;
8
 Ronald 
Allen and Kristen Mace discern “universal agreement” that the 
Machine is unacceptable;
9
 and Michael Pardo goes so far as to call 




I am skeptical. Against the scholarly chorus, this Article 
offers a tempered constitutional defense of mind-reading on both 
doctrinal and normative grounds. Doctrinally, self-incrimination 
analysis turns on the distinction between “physical evidence” and 
“testimonial communication.” Only the latter is privileged.
11
 The 
difficulty, however, is that “testimonial” invites competing 
constructions. The first focuses on the cognitive product of 
disclosure, the second on the communicative process of 
                                                 
6
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).  
7
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 371.  
8
 Nina Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 354 (2012).  
9
 Ronald J. Allen & Kristen Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and 
its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 249 (2003).  
10
 Michael S. Pardo, Disentangling the Fourth Amendment and the Self-
Incrimination Clause, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1857, 1879 (2005). Although this 
sounds extreme, in describing the view this way, Pardo simply literalizes the 
view that other scholars implicitly embrace. See, e.g., Allen & Mace, supra note 
9, at 249 (justifying their view that mind-reading violates the Constitution with 
the naked observation that a “universal intuition” supports it); Farahany, supra 
note 8, at 354 (making no argument against the Machine except to say that its 
use seems “amiss” of privacy norms); Fox, supra note 5, at 767 (citing the 
“widely held intuitions that the Fifth Amendment should protect against brain 
imaging” as what “propels [his] inquiry” into why the Machine is unacceptable).  
11
 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 
U.S. 582, 588-89 (1990); Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 208 (1988); Fisher v. U.S., 
425 US 391, 409 (1976); see U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an overview of the 
textual history of the Self-Incrimination Clause, see Akhil Amar & Renee 
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 
MICH. L. REV. 857 (1995). In the shadow of the Mind Reader Machine, many 
scholars have begun to reconsider this framework. Indeed, according to the 
strongest of these accounts, the Mind Reader Machine demands nothing short of 
full overhaul – scrapping the physical-testimonial distinction and reinventing the 
privilege on other grounds. See, e.g., Farahany supra note 8, at 354-55; Fox, 
supra note 5, at 792 (“Brain imaging is difficult to classify because it promises 
distinctly testimonial-like information about the content of a person's mind that 
is packaged in demonstrably physical-like form.”). I disagree. In my view, the 
physical-testimonial divide reflects a construction of the privilege that is both 
sound in the abstract and suitable for analyzing the forcible extraction of 
cognitive evidence.  
4
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 Existing doctrinal arguments against the Mind Reader 
Machine rely on the first construction. I demonstrate, by contrast, 
that the second construction — the “communication-based” view 
of testimony — better integrates the case law and stands up more 
persuasively to metaphysical scrutiny. From there, I unpack what 
the communication-based view entails, concluding that 
“testimonial communication” stems from an intentional act on the 
suspect’s part that discloses information about the suspect’s mental 
states. Finally, I apply this definition to various forms of the 
Machine, some more realistic, others more fanciful. Certain 
versions of the Machine, I argue, would be wholly permissible 
under the communication-based view of testimony; others would 
present more difficult scenarios and, like all hard questions of law, 
be amenable to good faith dispute. What is definitively wrong, 
however, is the currently reigning view: that the Mind Reader 
Machine presents a paradigm case for the Fifth Amendment, and 
that all of its incarnations would run afoul of the self-incrimination 
privilege.  
After establishing my doctrinal position, I justify its 
conclusion against normative alarm. The strongest freestanding 
indictment of the Machine is that its use would violate individual 
privacy. This argument, while analytically forceful, militates in 
favor of restrictions on the Machine, not outright prohibition. In 
other words, the privacy argument finds proper accommodation in 
the Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth. The second normative tack 
against the Mind Reader Machine is that it would frustrate guilt-
innocence determinations in practice. This position takes a variety 
of forms, all of which provide interesting (and possibly 
compelling) foundations for the self-incrimination privilege in 
general – but none of which are apposite to mind-reading.
13
     
                                                 
12
 See, e.g., Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 367.  
13
 See infra Part III.B. Broadly, the arguments are as follows. First, the state 
should bear the burden of fully proving its case rather than relying on a 
defendant to furnish the state with evidence – and the Mind Reader Machine 
inverts this dynamic. Infra note 174. This, I argue, simply begs the question it 
purports to resolve. Second, the self-incrimination privilege aims to protect 
suspects from facing the “cruel trilemma” of incrimination, perjury, and 
contempt. Even if this claim is persuasive in other Fifth Amendment settings, I 
argue that it is unpersuasive in setting of the Mind Reader Machine. The whole 
point of the Machine is that it deprives a suspect of choice – vacating any 
concern about compromised choice. Third, the privilege operates as a 
constructive “excuse” doctrine. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and 
Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1988). Even assuming this to be so arguendo, 
it makes no contact with the Mind Reader Machine for the same reason as the 
“cruel trilemma” complaint. Fourth, in a world without a right to silence, guilty 
suspects would have a strong incentive to lie, creating a dilutive “pooling 
effect,” making it harder for fact-finders to distinguish between authentic and 
inauthentic proclamations of innocence. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, 
5
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Ronald Allen and Kristen Mace begin their seminal article 
on self-incrimination by observing that the Mind Reader Machine 
has “bedeviled analysis of the Fifth Amendment,” despite the 
“universal intuition” that its use would be unconstitutional.
14
 This 
observation strikes me as correct. But unlike Allen and Mace, who 
take the intuition as a guiding light for doctrinal reconstruction, I 
proceed in the opposite direction. I argue that it is the intuition, not 
the current state of doctrine, which collapses under strain. The 
error here is understandable enough. Mind-reading sounds in 
dystopia, totalitarianism, the stuff of our political nightmares.
15
 In 
response to these specters, most scholars, including Allen and 
Mace, have refrained from building a careful case against the Mind 
Reader Machine. Instead, they have assumed that its use would be 
unconstitutional and reverse-engineered theories of self-
incrimination from there.
16
 And this assumption has provoked little 
resistance, not so much because the constitutional arguments 
against mind-reading are self-evident, but because something in 
the larger dynamic evoked by the Machine — the image of state 
power that it conveys — simply feels unacceptable.
17
  
                                                                                                             
The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth 
Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430 (2000). In actuality, this 
observation cuts in favor of the Machine, insofar as its use would help 
distinguish guilt and innocence more sharply. Finally, there is a fifth normative 
argument, more indirect than the first four, which I take up only briefly. 
Namely, the physical-testimonial divide hinges on an antiquated, non-scientific 
distinction between body and mind and, for that reason, should be discarded. 
See, e.g., Fox supra note 5, at 793; Holloway, supra note, at 166-67; Stoller & 
Wolpe, supra note 4, at 365-67. Even assuming that characterization to be true, 
however, it does not follow that the physical-testimonial divide is inapt to its 
legal task. On the substantive view of “testimony,” the status of evidence turns 
on whether it discloses something physical or cognitive, a question that 
neuroscience has left nettled. But on the communication-based view of 
testimony — that is, on my view — the status of evidence turns only on the role 
the criminal suspect plays in its production. To the best of my knowledge, 
neuroscience has left this inquiry unscathed. The deconstructive approach to the 
physical-testimonial distinction assumes that “testimony” refers to an intrinsic 
quality of evidence rather than the process by which it is obtained. Yet this is 
precisely what is at stake.   
14
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 249.  
15
 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 5, at 798 (calling the Mind Reader Machine “not so 
different, and less radical in fact, than similar possibilities portrayed in 
contemporary film and literature such as George Orwell's 1984 and Steven 
Spielberg's Minority Report.”); William Federspiel, Note, 1984 Arrives: 
Thought (Crime), Technology, and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF 
RTS. J. 865 (2008); Thompson, supra note 4. 
16
 Michael S. Pardo is the most explicit in this orientation: he openly refers to 
the Mind Reader Machine as a “reductio ad absurdum.” Pardo, supra note 10, at 
1879. See supra note 10. 
17
 Many of the arguments develop in an overtly aesthetic vein. Many begin with 
cosmic proclamations about the role of mind-reading (and truth-telling) in the 
6
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In what follows, I take this assumption to task. On scrutiny, 
I argue that the categorical case against the Mind Reader Machine 
                                                                                                             
West. See, e.g., Federspiel, supra note 15, at 865-68; Stoller & Wolpe, supra 
note 4, at 374-76 (the article begins by noting that “[t]he development of a 
successful lie detector has been a dream of governments and law enforcement 
since ancient times,” and then proceeds to cite a text from 900 B.C. and expound 
on the role of lie detection in Ancient Greece). The effect is to present mind-
reading less as a concrete possibility than as a counterfactual scenario, the stuff 
of literary dystopia – frightening because it is abstractly proximate, but also, 
making no contact with our world, safely at bay. This is true of the construction 
of fact patterns as well. They introduce the issue of mind-reading, they weave 
complicated narratives of police interrogation, often melding different legal 
problems together into a composite hypothetical designed to “set the stage.” 
Ronald Allen and Kristen Mace, for example, jumpstart their analysis with an 
involved, four-paragraph hypothetical about compelled polygraph tests – 
floating on its own, literally set apart from the rest of the text. Allen & Mace, 
supra note 9, at 248-49. Nina Farahany does similarly, spinning a fact pattern 
about two masked men murdering a woman in her home, and the imagines the 
various interrogation methods that police might use to gather evidence about the 
crime. Farahany, supra note 8, at 353-54. Matthew Holloway opens his 
Comment, One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words, with a vivid 
doomsday scenario about a bomb going off in the Constitution Center in 
Philadelphia, from which he quickly pivots to a new hypothetical, adduced for 
the same point, about an everyday mugging. Holloway, supra note 4, at 141-42. 
Each of these snapshots goes far beyond what is necessary to convey 
the relevant legal issue. What is more, each snapshot contains surplus content 
that produces distinct and confusing strands of legal controversy. For example, 
imagining a scenario in which “John Doe” is compelled to sit for a polygraph 
test, Allen and Mace include the following sentences: “The officers try to 
physically restrain him, but he resists. Eventually, they strap Doe to a gurney 
and attach a polygraph machine.” Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 248. If the 
point is to explore the implications of mind-reading under the Court’s view of 
“testimonial communication,” why introduce the variable of physical roughness 
from the police? What does this possibly add? Farahany takes a similar tack 
when envisioning the extraction techniques that police officers might employ to 
gather information from the “masked men” in her hypothetical. These include 
obtaining structural brain images and measuring automatic physiological 
responses to stimuli. Farahany, supra note 8, at 354. So far, so good – but the 
final extraction technique that Farahany imagines is the “elicit[ation of] brain-
based but interpretable responses to their questions by whatever means 
necessary, including torturous ones.” Id. (emphasis added). Where is this 
hyperbole coming from? Just as with Allen and Mace, if the point is to expound 
on mind-reading, I am not sure what purpose it serves to evoke the specter of an 
entirely different form of governmental abuse – it seems only to muddy the 
doctrinal waters. Indeed, Holloway’s version is the most over-the-top of all. 
Imagining a bomb going off in the Constitution Center, he muses that in “an 
emotionally loaded situation such as this it is easy to ignore the subtle legal 
issues surrounding the use of neuroimaging in interrogation. We want the 
terroristic act avenged, whatever the cost.” Holloway, supra note 4, at 141. He 
also justifies his project with similarly highfalutin rhetoric: “[t]he awesome” — 
at another point, he calls it “Orwellian” — power an irresponsible government 
might wield with an unhindered ability to use brain-imaging technology must be 
addressed.” Id. at 143. 
7
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unravels, resolving into a more nuanced — and lawyerly — bundle 
of technology-specific issues. The endpoint is neither to purge the 
Machine of all constitutional alarm, nor to vindicate its use in 
every circumstance. The goal is substantially more modest: to shift 
the debate over mind-reading to more granular terrain and, in the 
same swoop, to crystallize the Court’s self-incrimination 
jurisprudence. Part One situates the Mind Reader Machine in the 
context of modern self-incrimination doctrine. Because the 
genealogy has already been well documented elsewhere,
18
 and 
because Part Two burrows into many of the cases independently, 
this overview is brief. Part Two defends mind-reading on doctrinal 
grounds; Part Three, on normative grounds. Part Four concludes. 
  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PHYSICAL-TESTIMONIAL DIVIDE  
 
The modern era of self-incrimination jurisprudence began 
with Schmerber v. California.
19
 In Schmerber, the Court 
confronted an issue that would become a touchstone for later cases: 
Does a compelled blood test violate the Fifth Amendment? Writing 
for the plurality, Justice Brennan characterized the privilege as “a 
bar against compelling ‘communications’ or ‘testimony’” but 
clarified that “compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the 
source of ‘real or physical evidence’ does not violate it.”
20
 
Applying this standard to blood tests, Justice Brennan reasoned 
that the extraction and analysis of blood required “not even a 
shadow of testimonial compulsion upon or enforced 
communication by the accused.”
21
 Therefore, despite being 
compulsory and incriminating, blood tests pose no cause for Fifth 
Amendment concern. Schmerber gave birth to an entire 
precedential line following in its spirit: the so-called exemplar 
cases, which have shaped the bounds of what evidence the state 
can extract by compulsion. The examples are familiar to anyone 
who has ever seen a police drama. For example, the state may 
                                                 
18
 See, e.g., Holloway, supra note 4, at 157-66; Farahany, supra note 8, at 356-
66.  
19
 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Although the ruling in Schmerber was novel — and 
initiated a new era of self-incrimination jurisprudence — it did not come from 
the ether. The Court drew on previous case law to substantiate its distinction 
between physical and testimonial evidence. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 
432 (1957) (holding that a mandatory blood test to determine intoxication does 
not violate due process); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (holding 
that it does not violate the Fifth Amendment to compel a defendant to try on a 
blouse). 
20
 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.  
21
 Id. at 765.  
8
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force criminal suspects to participate in line-ups,
22
 to submit 
handwriting examples,
23
 to make voice recordings,
24
 and so on,all 
without piquing Fifth Amendment scrutiny.  
United in their conformity to the same rationale, the 
exemplar cases represent a bright spot in the self-incrimination 
canon. The remainder is considerably murkier. Ten years after 
Schmerber, in Fisher v. United States, the Court held that a 
subpoena compelling the defendant’s attorney to produce tax 
documents did not violate the defendant’s Fifth Amendment 
rights.
25
 This was so, the Court reasoned, because compliance with 
the subpoena would require no testimonial act from the defendant; 
it was directed to, and would only require action from, the 
defendant’s attorney.
26
 In the course of rendering this holding, 
however, the Court recognized the principle that “act[s] of 
producing evidence in response to a subpoena [] [can have] 
communicative aspects of [their] own, wholly aside from the 
contents of the papers produced.”
27
 Inasmuch, the Fisher Court 
reserved the possibility that compliance with a subpoena (or any 
other production order) could trigger the privilege. The issue 
would turn, the Court said, on whether the production required by 




The standard from Fisher has twice since been clarified. 
First, in Doe v. United States, the Court examined the implications 
of an order requiring the defendant to sign a consent directive 
authorizing the release of information about his foreign bank 
accounts.
29
 It was illegal for the bank to release information to the 
United States government without the accountholder’s consent; 
gaining access to relevant bank records, therefore, required the 
suspect’s cooperation. In Fisher, it was the defendant’s attorney, 
not the defendant himself, to whom the order was directed. In Doe, 
by contrast, it was the defendant who would be required to act. The 
question was whether the called-for action, authorizing the release 
                                                 
22
 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
23
 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
24
 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
25
 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). Fisher effectively overturned the 
19
th
 century precedent Boyd v. U.S., which held that the government is barred 
from compelling a criminal suspect from turning over incriminating documents 
(or, in the vernacular of the times, “private papers”). See 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
Since Fisher, the analytical retreat from Boyd has only crystallized further. See 
Richard Nagareda, Compulsion “To Be A Witness” and the Resurrection of 
Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575, 1578 (1999).  
26
 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 399-401.  
27
 Id. at 410. 
28
 Id. at 409.  
29
 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).  
9
Brennan-Marquez: A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING 
 
 223 
of information, would require a “testimonial declaration” from the 
defendant. The Court held that it would not, on the theory that 
while the consent directive would allow the bank to disclose 
information, the act of signing it did not disclose any information 
— and thus was not testimonial — in and of itself.
30
  
Twelve years later, United States v. Hubbell raised a 
similar question.
31
 The defendant was prosecuted for mail fraud 
and tax evasion based on documents that had come to light because 
of his compliance with an earlier subpoena; he argued that the 
evidence derived from the documents should be privileged as fruits 
of a testimonial act of production.
32
 In opposition, the government 
relied on Fisher and Doe, arguing that the incriminating evidence 
was not privileged because it was the “fruit only of a simple 
physical act – the act of producing the documents.”
33
 The Court 
agreed with defendant. Focusing on the fact that the government 
had no preexisting knowledge of the documents produced in the 
response to the subpoena, the Court reasoned that the subpoena 
required the defendant “to make extensive use of the contents of 
his own mind in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive 
to the requests in the subpoena.”
34
 The issue was essentially one of 
tailoring. In the Court’s view, compliance with the subpoena was 
testimonial because the subpoena was vague to an extent that 
compliance required the defendant to take “mental steps.”
35
 Those 
mental steps, not the content of the documents themselves, 
triggered the privilege.  
So stands the Court’s “act of production” jurisprudence.
36
 
The other two self-incrimination cases of important note — both 
discussed in great detail below — are Estelle v. Smith and 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz. In Estelle, the Court held that the privilege 
obtains during psychiatric evaluation because answering a 
                                                 
30
 Id. at 215-16.  
31
 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).  
32
 Id. at 31-32.  
33
 Id. at 29.  
34
 Id. at 43.  
35
 Id. at 40.  
36
 The “mental steps” standard from Hubbell is not without its detractors. See, 
e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Testimony, 82 TUL. L. REV. 119, 184-88 (2007) (arguing 
that the Hubbell Court has a less than precise view of what testimony entails). 
The standard also raises new and evolving questions about the production of 
digital information and cyber-evidence. See Vivek Mohan & John Villasenor, 
Decrypting the Fifth Amendment: The Limits of Self-Incrimination in the Digital 
Era, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. HEIGHT. SCRUTINY 11 (2012). See also Lance Cole, 
The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of Personal Documents After 
United States v. Hubbell - New Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. 
L. 123 (2002) (arguing that Hubbell essentially overruled Fisher and exploring 
its possible implications moving forward).   
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psychiatrist’s questions constitutes a testimonial act.
37
 In Muniz, 
the defendant was stopped while suspected of driving under the 
influence and subjected to a variety of sobriety tests. Among them 
was a verbal interrogation designed to assess intoxication: The 
stopping officer asked the defendant, “Do you know what the date 
was of your sixth birthday?” to which the defendant responded, 
“No, I don’t.”
38
 A plurality of the Court held that the sixth birthday 
question required a testimonial response from the defendant – and 
was therefore privileged.
39
 Conceptually, Muniz is something of a 
Pandora’s Box; I explore its holding systematically in the next 
Part. 
 
II. REASSESSING THE DOCTRINE: A COMMUNICATION-BASED 
VIEW OF “TESTIMONY” 
 
For now, my goal is not to ask whether the physical-
testimonial distinction ought to be discarded. It is to examine what 
the distinction, left intact, implies for the Mind Reader Machine. 
Two prominent articles have taken up this question, reconstructing 
the case law to theorize what motivates the Court: Michael Pardo’s 
“Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure,”
40
 and Ronald Allen and Kristen Mace’s “The Self-
Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted.”
41
 Pardo 
interprets the Court’s holdings to suggest that “[the] government 
may not compel for use as evidence the content of a suspect’s . . . . 
beliefs, thoughts, doubts, hopes, wishes, desires, knowledge, and 
so on.”
42
 Allen and Mace, meanwhile, construe “testimony,” in the 
self-incrimination context, to refer to “the substantive results of 
cognition.”
43
 These views trace the same orbit. They suggest that 
in addition to a suspect’s well-established right to refuse to 
disclose cognitive evidence, a suspect also has the right to shield 
certain cognitive evidence from extraction – even if the extraction 
requires no intentional act of disclosure. On both accounts, the 
question for Fifth Amendment purposes is what relationship the 
evidence bears to the suspect’s cognition: whether it expresses 
mental states with propositional content (Pardo), or it reflects the 
                                                 
37
 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). This opinion is explored at some length 
infra in Part II.  
38
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 586 (1992).  
39
 Id. at 582-606.  
40
 Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301 (2006). 
41
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9.  
42
 Pardo, supra note 40, at 330.  
43
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 246.  
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substantive results of cognition (Allen and Mace). If so, it is 
privileged ipso facto.   
My skepticism about this view of “testimony” begins with 
the architecture of Allen and Mace’s and Pardo’s articles. Both 
endeavor (a) to synthesize the existing case law, and (b) to solve 
the “puzzle” of why the Mind Reader Machine is unacceptable. 
That is, they posit as a premise that the Machine is constitutionally 
forbidden and, from there, elaborate constructions of the case law. 
What neither article accounts for — not at all surprisingly, given 
their starting point — are interpretations of “testimony” that 
explain existing jurisprudence but permit the possibility of the 
Mind Reader Machine. They fail, in other words, to examine 
whether their interpretations of “testimony” are actually the most 
plausible constructions of the case law, once the auxiliary premise 
about the impermissibility of the Mind Reader Machine 
disappears. Taking up that mantle, I argue that the case law is 
ambiguous between (1) a substantive view of “testimony,” which 
locates the privilege in the content of what is disclosed, and would 
thus disallow mind-reading; and (2) a communication-based view 
of “testimony,” which locates the privilege in the process of 
disclosure, and would accordingly permit certain forms of mind-
reading.
44
 I argue that the latter more crisply integrates the case 
                                                 
44
 I am certainly not the first commentator to notice this ambiguity. However, 
previous treatments have tended toward the cursory side. See Fox, supra note 5; 
Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4. Given that Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s articles 
are prominent works in the field, the Court’s embrace of the communication-
based view of testimony deserves a full exposition. It also bears note that 
“testimonial communication” does not hang in limbo because of any 
jurisprudential error. It is the straightforward outcome of unforeseen 
technological change. In their article on emerging neurotechnologies, Sarah 
Stoller and Paul Wolpe put the point nicely: “Although courts have generally 
interpreted the self-incrimination clause as protecting against the use of 
“testimonial” or “communicative” evidence, it is not entirely clear whether the 
defining quality of “communicative” is the act of communicating or the product 
of the communication. When courts speak of the clause as prohibiting the forced 
‘disclos[ure of] the contents of [one's] own mind,’ they refer both to the act of 
communicating (the disclosing) and the product of the communication (the 
contents of one's mind). Until now of course, the two have been inextricably 
linked; in order for the contents of a person's mind to be exposed, he had to 
communicate that content actively, whether by speaking, writing, gesticulating, 
or some other deliberate means.” Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 367 (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,594) (1990) (internal citations omitted). In 
other words, in previous ages, when the extraction of cognitive evidence without 
a suspect’s cooperation was the stuff of fantasy, the Court could reasonably rely 
on the moniker “communication” to encapsulate both the process and the 
product of disclosure. See Fox, supra note 5, at 786; Stoller & Wolpe, supra 
note 4, at 367. No longer – the possibility of forcibly extracted cognitive 
evidence has split this dyad in two. In this sense, consternation surrounding the 
Mind Reader Machine goes deeper than its totalitarian valences. It raises, as no 
other interrogation method has before, the question of what grounds “testimony” 
12
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law — in particular, by accommodating the Court’s holding in 
Muniz and more convincingly reconstructing the Court’s theory in 
Estelle — and that it also avoids a host of line-drawing problems 
that vex its substantive counterpart.  
A. Pardo’s Substantive View of “Testimony” 
 
Pardo arrives at his theory by combining two broad 
principles. The first principle, reflected in Schmerber and the 
exemplar cases, is that purely physical evidence garners no 
protection under the Self-Incrimination Clause, even if its seizure 
requires a suspect to produce something “from [his] body.”
45
 The 
second principle, codified in the “act of production” cases, is that 
evidence is protected if its production requires a “testimonial act,” 
regardless of whether the evidence would be privileged 
independently.  
For Pardo, these two principles resolve into one 
overarching principle: the government “may not compel for use as 
evidence the content of a suspect's propositional attitude.”
46
 The 
concept of “propositional attitudes” refers to mental states with 
propositional content – for example, that “so and so is the case 
(e.g., that the victim was out of town during the robbery) or 
knowledge that such and such is the case (e.g., that the subject 
robbed the house).”
47
 The legal principle, therefore, is that 
evidence is “testimonial,” and thus triggers the privilege, when two 
conditions are met: (a) the evidence discloses the content of a 
suspect’s “propositional attitudes,” and (b) the government 
adduces the evidence for that propositional content.  
Pardo glosses his overarching principle with two concrete 
examples from the case law. The first is Estelle v. Smith, in which 
the Court held that a criminal suspect’s statements during a court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation were “testimonial” for self-
incrimination purposes.
48
 Of specific importance to the Court — 
and what Pardo takes to vindicate his theory of testimony — is that 
the prosecution used the “substance of the suspect’s disclosures,” 
not some other aspect of his expression, to incriminate him.
49
 
Pardo’s second example is the “sixth birthday question” from 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz. After pulling over a driver suspected of 
driving while intoxicated, the officer asked the driver if he could 
                                                                                                             
in the first place: the substance of what is produced, or the method by which it 
is? 
45
 Pardo, supra note 40, at 329.  
46
 Id. at 330.  
47
 Id.  
48
 See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).   
49
 Pardo, supra note 40, at 330-31. 
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recall the date of his sixth birthday; he replied “No, I don’t 
[know]”; and that locution was later used as evidence of the 
driver’s intoxication level.
50
 A four-member plurality of the Court 
held that the driver’s response was testimonial — and thus 
privileged — because it required the suspect “to communicate an 
express or implied assertion of fact or belief.”
51
 Pardo disagrees 
with this result. Although the answer, “No, I don’t [know],” 
certainly required the suspect to express something, it did not go to 
the content of the driver’s mental states, only to his level of 
intoxication. Therefore, under Pardo’s “propositional attitude” 
metric, the response was not testimonial.  
B. Allen and Mace’s Substantive View of “Testimony” 
 
Allen and Mace offer a more sweeping, if less systematic, 
summary of the case law. In essence, their view is that self-
incrimination reaches the “substantive results of cognition,” a 
proposition they cull from a long genealogy of case law, beginning 
with Justice Brennan’s contention, in Schmerber, that “the 
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify 
against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a 
testimonial or communicative nature.”
52
 To say that Allen and 
Mace consider Schmerber less than an exemplary work of legal 
reason would be substantial understatement. They openly ridicule 
Justice Brennan’s articulation of the physical-testimonial divide.
53
 
Nevertheless, following the Court, Allen and Mace take the divide 
as an axiomatic starting point for analyzing the self-incrimination 
case law. 
The second case on Allen and Mace’s docket is Estelle, 
which they believe buttresses their theory. Because the Court’s 
evaluation of the psychiatric examination “specifically rejected the 
claim that the psychiatrist [in a court-ordered examination] was 
observing the patient’s communications simply to infer facts of his 
mind, rather than to examine the truth of the patient’s 
statements,”
54
 Allen and Mace conclude that what mattered in 
Estelle was not the fact that the defendant made disclosures, but 
rather, “[what] the defendant’s communication to the doctor 
disclose[d],” namely, “the substantive results of [his] cognition.”
55
  
                                                 
50
 See 496 U.S. 582 (1990).  
51
 Id. at 597.  
52
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 260 (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 761).   
53
 Id. at 260 (referring to the “obvious flaw” in Justice Brennan’s view).  
54
 Id. at 269 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 n.12 (1983) 
(citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981)). 
55
 Id.   
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Allen and Mace’s next case is U.S. v. Doe. They draw 
strength from the Court’s holding that an order that compelled a 
defendant to authorize account disclosures did not involve a 
testimonial act. This harmonizes, Allen and Mace argue, with their 
substantive view of testimony: the important point is that by 
complying with the order, defendant “had to use his will or faculty 
of deliberate action to follow directions in signing his name,” but 
that he did not have to “disclose the substantive results of 
cognition.”
56
 And this distinction replicates itself, they argue, in 
the other “act of production” cases as well.
57
 
Last, but most definitely not least, Allen and Mace turn to 
Muniz, which they regard as “the only datum not obviously 
explained by [their] theory” – specifically, the sixth birthday 
question. Muniz is problematic for Allen and Mace for the same 
reason that it is problematic for Pardo: although “[i]t is true that 
cognition is involved in knowing one’s [birthday, the] revelation of 
the substantive knowledge is not incriminating.”
58
 However, while 
Pardo concedes that his theory predicts a different result than the 
Muniz plurality and leaves it at that, Allen and Mace rail against 
the plurality’s view. First, they make sure to emphasize that only 
four Justices signed on to the content of Justice Brennan’s plurality 
opinion.
59
 Second, they explain the whole case away as an 
aberration: “Never before or since,” write Allen and Mace, “has 
the Court held that a physical or psychological process deserves 
protection independent of its substantive results.”
60
 Whether this is 
entirely accurate, I examine in more detail below.   
 
C. Why Both Substantive Views Are Ambiguous 
 
A common current of ambiguity runs through Pardo’s and 
Allen and Mace’s theories. In both articles, virtually every data 
point offered in defense of the substantive view of testimony is 
                                                 
56
 Id. at 271.   
57
 “All subpoenas,” they write, “involve cognition.” Id. at 272. The question, 
post-Hubbell, is what the parameters of “testimony” will be – which is exactly 
what Allen and Mace believe future jurisprudence about subpoena compliance 
vis-à-vis the self-incrimination privilege will address. In fact, they dedicate the 
entire end of their article to this question. Id. at 277-93. 
58
 Id. at 276.  
59
 Indeed, they go so far as to suggest that Justice Marshall’s opinion — 
formally the fifth vote for the Court — should be read against the grain of its 
literal meaning. Id. at 275-76 (“Although Marshall stated that the sixth birthday 
question is testimonial, his vote on this issue is undermined by his failure to 
agree with Brennan about the distinction between this question and the sobriety 
tests. Marshall’s concurrence should be read as a vote for bolstering the 
Miranda prophylactic rule and not as a vote on the competing theories of the 
testimonial/physical distinction.”). See infra Part II.D.1.   
60
 Id. at 276. 
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also accommodated — and predicted — by a communication-
based view. Indeed, the only data point of which this is not true is 
the impermissibility of the Mind Reader Machine – which, of 
course, is not a data point drawn from the case law, but rather, a 
supposition of the authors’ imaginations. Once we correct for that 
supposition, the substantive and communication-based views of 
testimony fall back into conceptual parity.
 61
  
Consider the two principles that comprise Pardo’s theory. 
The first — that purely physical evidence is not privileged — 
plainly comports with the proposition that evidence is testimonial 
only if its production requires a suspect to engage in a 
communicative act. By definition, the extraction of physical 
evidence requires no communication from a suspect: so, it is 
unprivileged. Pardo’s second principle — that evidence is 
privileged, as in Hubbell, if the act of its production embeds 
testimonial content — also jibes with a communication-based 
view. In fact, the communication-based view captures the spirit of 
the “act of production” cases much better than the substantive 
view. On a straightforward reading of Hubbell, Doe, and Fisher, 
the fulcrum of self-incrimination analysis is the role that a suspect 
plays in the act of production — “mak[ing] extensive use of the 
contents of his own mind” — not the content of what is produced.  
I am not saying that Pardo and Allen and Mace are 
necessarily wrong to marshal Hubbell and the rest of the “act of 
production” canon as evidence to their view. It is possible to parse 
the phrase “mak[ing] extensive use of the contents of his own 
mind”
62
 to refer to the content, rather than the process, of 
disclosure. But this is plainly the more circuitous interpretation, 
since it requires reading around the word “use.” Indeed, the Doe 
Court arrived at essentially the same conclusion when it disclaimed 
a content-based view of the privilege, holding, instead, that it 
turned on what role the suspect played in the production of 
evidence.
63
 “Contrary to petitioner's urging,” Justice Blackmun 
wrote, “the Schmerber line of cases does not draw a distinction 
between unprotected evidence sought for its physical 
characteristics and protected evidence sought for its content.” 
Rather, he continued, “the Court distinguished between the 
                                                 
61
 In other words, if the substantive view only maintains greater explanatory 
power than the communication-based view insofar as the Mind Reader Machine 
is assumed to be unacceptable, two inferences are equally likely: first, that the 
substantive view of testimony is superior to the communication-based view (as 
Pardo and Allen and Mace conclude); and second, that mind-reading is 
constitutional. Without knowing more, it is simply wrong to suggest that the first 
inference is more natural than the second.     
62
 United States v. Hubbell. 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000) (emphasis added). 
63
 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 209-10 (1988). 
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suspect's being compelled himself to serve as evidence and the 
suspect's being compelled to disclose or communicate information 
or facts that might serve as or lead to incriminating evidence,” and 
only the latter is protected.
 64
 Again, this is not to say that act of 
production cases cannot be reconciled with the substantive view of 
testimony. At least as to their core holding, if not their logic, 
reconciliation is certainly possible – but it is just as certainly the 
less parsimonious route. 
Finally, and most importantly, the communication-based 
view accounts for Estelle and Muniz far more naturally than either 
Pardo’s theory or Allen and Mace’s. With respect to Muniz, this 
comes as little surprise, since both Pardo and Allen and Mace 
explain away the sixth birthday question as wrongly decided. With 
respect to Estelle, the analysis is slightly more intricate. Although 
the substantive view can account for the case’s broad holding — 
that psychiatric evaluations triggers the privilege — Pardo and 
Allen and Mace both gloss over the full texture of the Court’s 
reasoning. A careful reading of Estelle demonstrates that the Court 
in fact distinguishes between evaluations during which the suspect 
speaks and — hypothetically — evaluations during which the 
suspect remains silent while the psychiatrist documents 
observations. Insofar as this distinction hinges on the presence or 
absence of communication, it is strong evidence in support of the 
communication-based view. Indeed, as I argue in more detail 
below, the “silent psychiatric evaluation” hypothetical serves as a 
fruitful analogy for mind-reading.  
D. Why the Communication-Based View of “Testimony” Is 
More Plausible 
 
My claim is simple enough. If the case law does, in fact, 
cleave to competing interpretations of “testimony” — substantive 
and communication-based — the weaknesses introduced above, 
and expounded below, cut against Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s 
theories, and in favor of a communication-based view. To unpack 
this claim, it will be useful to keep in mind the two possible forms 
that a substantive construction of testimony can take. The first 
form, which I will call the “narrow” variant of the substantive 
view, is what both Pardo and Allen and Mace propound: evidence 
                                                 
64
 Id. at 211, n.10 (emphasis added). For an overview of how this understanding 
of testimony squares with the Court’s previous interpretations, see Charles 
Geyh, The Testimonial Component of the Right Against Self-Incrimination, 36 
CATH. U. L. REV. 611, 634 (1987) (“In Holt, Schmerber, Wade, Gilbert, and 
Byers, the Court had referred to communications and testimony in the same 
breath, drawing no distinctions between them as far as their eligibility for fifth 
amendment protection was concerned.”).  
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is “testimonial” if it discloses the content of a suspect’s cognition, 
but not if it discloses only background mental states.
65
 The second 
form, which I will call the “wide” variant of the substantive view, 
is broader in scope: evidence is “testimonial” if it discloses either 
the content of a suspect’s cognition or his background mental 
states. Although the latter construction is virtually never defended 
in the scholarship or the case law,
66
 it serves an important 
analytical purpose. Namely, it encapsulates a metaphysical 
distinction between types of mental states that the narrow variant 
of the substantive view, if it is to prevail, must sustain.  
1. Reconsidering Pennsylvania v. Muniz  
 
The first weakness of Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s 
theories is their inability to contend with the sixth birthday 
question from Muniz. The case is a puzzling one, comprised of 
three, uncomfortably overlapping opinions. First, Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion holds that the “sixth birthday 
question,” unlike the physical aspects of the field sobriety test (like 
walking a line), violated the Fifth Amendment because it required 
the driver to engage in a testimonial act.
67
 Second, Justice 
Marshall’s concurrence formally incorporates Justice Brennan’s 
logic — or purports to — but also offers a different, far broader 
rationale: left to his own devices, Justice Marshall would privilege 
every aspect of the field sobriety as “testimonial,” not just the sixth 
birthday question, because all of the evidence goes equally to the 
driver’s mental state.
68
 Third, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for 
the four dissenters, argues that the sixth birthday question was 
merely a means of ascertaining the driver’s intoxication level – and 
is therefore equivalent, for Fifth Amendment purposes, to the 
physical components of the field sobriety test.
69
  
In light of case’s layered complexity, and the appearance, 
at points, that none of the three opinions knows quite what to make 
of “testimony,” Pardo and Allen and Mace both attempt to jettison 
Muniz. On their view, the plurality erred in holding the sixth 
birthday question testimonial – and in any event, this view was 
                                                 
65
 Pardo uses the term “propositional” to denote the importance of content over 
form, and Allen and Mace, the term “substantive.”  
66
 The best example, perhaps the only example, is Justice Marshall’s 
concurrence in Muniz, which argues for the most latitudinous construction of 
“testimony” that I have encountered. Justice Marshall would privilege all 
evidence that goes to a driver’s intoxication level. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 
496 U.S. 582, 608 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
67
 Id. at 592-600. 
68
 Id. at 608-16 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69
 Id. at 606-08 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result, and 
dissenting in part).  
18
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss2/3
15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214 (2013)      2012-2013 
 
 232 
unable to hold five votes, so it is not binding law.
70
 Unfortunately 
for Pardo and Allen and Mace, the plurality’s communication-
based view of testimony is not so easily explained away. For a 
simple reason: it is not only the plurality in Muniz that embraces 
this view; the dissenting opinion does so as well, even as they 
advocate the opposite concrete holding. On scrutiny, it becomes 
clear that Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist both believe 
that the presence of a “communicative act” is what triggers the 
privilege – they simply disagree about how that view applies, in 
practice, to the sixth birthday question. Thus, whatever else might 
be said of Muniz’s chaotic patchwork, neither bloc of Justices 
seems concerned, as Pardo and Allen and Mace would predict, 
about whether the driver’s response disclosed something about his 
“propositional” or “substantive” mental states. Indeed, no Justice 
seemed interested in what the driver’s response disclosed at all. 
To begin with, the plurality opinion: Justice Brennan’s 
analysis of the sixth birthday question opens by considering the 
government’s theory that the question “Do you know what the date 
was of your sixth birthday?”,
71
 was simply aimed to procure 
evidence about the driver’s intoxication level and should therefore 
be permitted. Justice Brennan believes this theory to “address[] the 
wrong question.”
72
 To his mind, the observation 
 “that the ‘fact’ to be inferred might be said to 
concern the physical status of Muniz's brain merely 
describes the way in which the inference is 
incriminating. The correct question for present 
purposes is whether the incriminating inference of 




The question, in other words, is not what the answer “No, I don’t 
[know]” might allow a fact-finder to infer, but rather, whether the 
act of answering was physical or testimonial in the first place.
74
 
                                                 
70
 Or, one might say, it received four and a half votes, since it is not clear how 
far, or to what exactly, Justice Marshall intended his concurrence to reach. As 
Allen and Mace point out, “Although Marshall stated that the sixth birthday 
question is testimonial, his vote is undermined by his failure to agree with 
Brennan about the distinction between this question and the sobriety tests.” 
Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 276. For this reason, they advocate disregarding 
the literal meaning of Justice Marshall’s words in favor of an analytically 
favorable meaning. Id.. See also supra, note 59. 
71
 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 583. 
72
 Id. at 593.  
73
 Id.  
74
 See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 367 (“[T]he [Muniz] Court found that it 
is the testimonial (or communicative) aspect of the evidentiary act that garners 
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And as to that question, Justice Brennan found the answer obvious: 
trying and failing to recall the date of one’s birthday is a clear 
instance of “testimony.” 
Next, Justice Brennan doubles down on this view of 
testimony by reconstructing Schmerber, which also concerned the 
offense of driving while intoxicated.
75
 In that case, the Court 
(Justice Brennan, in fact) held that a compelled blood test, 
designed to measure intoxication level, was not privileged because 
it required no testimonial act.
76
 Revisiting the Schmerber result in 
Muniz, Justice Brennan draws a categorical distinction between the 
two cases. In his words, “[H]ad the police [in the Schmerber case] 
instead asked the suspect directly whether his blood contained a 
high concentration of alcohol” — that is, instead of physically 
drawing his blood and testing it — the suspect’s “affirmative 
response would have been testimonial even though it would have 
been used to draw the same inference concerning his 
physiology.”
77
 So, too, in Muniz: the proper inquiry regarding the 
sixth birthday question is not “whether a suspect's ‘impaired 
mental faculties’ can fairly be characterized as an aspect of his 
physiology, but rather whether [the suspect’s] response to the sixth 
birthday question that gave rise to the inference of such an 
impairment was testimonial in nature.”
78
 For Justice Brennan, the 
answer is a resounding yes. Defining communication as an act that 
“explicitly or implicitly relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s] 
information,”
79
 he holds the driver’s answer, “No, I don’t [know],” 
to fall under the privilege’s scope. 
It comes as no surprise, of course, that this holding cuts 
against Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s substantive construction of 
“testimony.” Both articles openly admit of their inability to explain 
the Muniz holding, and both, likewise, take steps to downplay the 
opinion’s salience to their theories.
80
 The success of these efforts, 
however, rises and falls on the implicit proposition that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Muniz rejects Justice 
Brennan’s communication-based view of testimony. No, alas. It is 
true that, as to the concrete question of whether the answer “No, I 
don’t [know]” is testimonial, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagrees 
with Justice Brennan: he would hold the answer non-testimonial 
because it goes to the same basic issue as the physical sobriety test 
                                                                                                             
Fifth Amendment protection. What the act conveys (the level of Muniz's 
intoxication or the physiological status of his brain) is irrelevant.”).  
75
 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591-93. 
76
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
77
 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 593.  
78
 Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added). 
79
 Id. at 594 (quoting Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988)). 
80
 See supra notes 50-51 & 59-60 and accompanying text.  
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss2/3
15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214 (2013)      2012-2013 
 
 234 
— impairment due to intoxication — and the fact that one test 
measures the impairment of a physical faculty, while the other test 
measures the impairment of a mental faculty, is irrelevant. The 
crucial point, however, is that Chief Justice Rehnquist actually 
agrees, in broad strokes, with Justice Brennan’s understanding of 
“testimony” – he simply disagrees, on a more granular level, about 
its application to the sixth birthday question in particular. 
Criticizing the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist argues 
that “[t]he need for the use of the human voice does not 
automatically make an answer testimonial,”
81
 and that the real 
question is whether the answer was “communica[tive]” and 
extort[ed]” from the suspect using “physical or moral 
compulsion.”
82
 In this respect, Chief Justice Rehnquist finds Muniz 
to fall short on the facts: the sixth birthday question, in his view, 
was nothing more than an ad hoc means of assessing sobriety, and 
the response “No, I don’t [know]” is the same, for self-
incrimination purposes, as, say, the locution “I can’t see the 
letters” uttered by a suspect forced to undergo an vision exam – 
which would clearly not be privileged.
83
 
The dissent’s underlying theory of testimony is thus no 
different in concept from that of the plurality opinion; it is different 
only in result. Although Justice Brennan asserts that, “the vast 
majority of verbal statements [] will be testimonial,” he also 
acknowledges, echoing Chief Justice Rehnquist, that not every 
verbal statement is testimonial.
84
 In fact, Justice Brennan is 
perfectly comfortable reserving space for non-testimonial verbal 
acts. Just as there is a difference between asking a suspect to 
produce a prescribed handwriting sample and asking a suspect to 
compose his own composition — the latter would be privileged, 
where the former would not be — so, too, is there a difference 
between verbal acts that are nothing more than mechanical and 
verbal acts that require the speaker to make a communicative 
assertion.
85
 For Justice Brennan, the sixth birthday question is an 
example of the latter. He would distinguish between, on the one 
hand, an officer asking a DWI suspect “What was the date . . . of 
your sixth birthday?” and on the other hand, the same officer 
asking the same suspect to repeat a tongue twister, even if both go 
                                                 
81
 Id. at 607 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result, and 
dissenting in part) (citing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967)).  
82
 Id. (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)). In the same 
analysis, Chief Justice Rehnquist approvingly cites Schmerber as well.  
83
 Id. at 608.  
84
 Id. at 597 (majority opinion) (citing Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 
(1988)). (““There are very few instances in which a verbal statement, either oral 
or written, will not convey information or assert facts”). 
85
 Id. at 597-98.   
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to the underlying issue of intoxication.
86
 Ultimately, it is this 
distinction, not Justice Brennan’s background conception of 
testimony, with which Chief Justice Rehnquist takes issue. He 
rejects the formalism of Justice Brennan’s approach – and instead 
emphasizes the functional equivalence of a physical sobriety test 
and the sixth birthday question.
87
  
In this light, Muniz becomes far more problematic for 
Pardo and Allen and Mace than initial appearances imply. If it is 
not just the plurality opinion but also the dissent that has to be 
explained away, their rhetorical strategy — disparaging the force 
of Justice Brennan’s opinion — fails to shoulder its burden. In 
addition to sidelining the plurality’s communication-based view of 
“testimony,” Pardo and Allen and Mace would either have to (a) 
demonstrate that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent does not adopt 
the same communication-based view, or (b) disparage the dissent 
alongside the plurality opinion. For the reasons just described, I 
find route (a) untenable; it seems to me that Chief Justice 
Rehnquist openly pledges fealty to the same communication-based 
view of testimony as the plurality opinion, even as his conclusion 
diverges from Justice Brennan’s. And route (b) would require 
Pardo and Allen and Mace to justify why their theories — self-
styled as “descriptive”
88
 — persist unscathed despite being 




                                                 
86
 See id.  
87
 In fact, the dispute between the plurality and dissent can be delineated even 
more narrowly. Not only do Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Rehnquist concur 
on the “enforced communication” view of testimony, compare id. at 607 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result, and dissenting in 
part) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966)), with id. at 593; 
they also agree about what separates testimonial communication from non-
testimonial communication. Namely, the former, unlike the latter, “subject[s] [a] 
suspect to the truth-falsity-silence predicament,” id. at 608 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part, concurring in result, and dissenting in part), that is, to the 
“cruel trilemma” of perjury, self-incrimination, or contempt. Thus, the only 
lasting difference between the two views is that Justice Brennan believes the 
sixth birthday question “confronted [the driver] with the trilemma,” id. at 599 
(majority opinion), whereas Chief Justice Rehnquist does not. Id. at 608 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part, concurring in the result, and dissenting in 
part).  Neither Justice interprets “testimony” in substantive terms, of either the 
wide or narrow variety discussed above. Rather, both interpret “testimony” in 
terms of communication and quibble, from there, about the practical 
implications of that view.  
88
 See Allen & Mace, supra note 9 at 249-50; Pardo, supra note 40, at 328-36. 
89
 Nor does it help their cause that Muniz — along with Estelle — is one of the 
only cases in existence that speaks directly to the question of “testimonial 
communication.” It would be one thing to prune away an on-point precedent in a 
doctrinally lush area of law. It is quite another to prune away one of the only on-
point precedents in a relatively sparse area.  
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I have my doubts. While one ruling, promulgated by one 
particular composition of Justices, does not determine the whole of 
doctrine, neither is one ruling irrelevant, especially in so fallow a 
jurisprudential landscape. Perhaps in tacit recognition of this 
predicament, Allen and Mace close their discussion of Muniz with 
one final gambit: writing Muniz off as an aberration. “Never 
before or since,” they write, “has the Court held that a physical or 
psychological process deserves protection independent of its 
substantive results.”
90
 This, however, is not necessarily true. It 
would be more accurate to say that the Court has never squarely 
had the opportunity to decide whether a physical or psychological 
process deserves protection independent of its substantive results. 
When it has upheld the use of compelled “physical” evidence like 
blood tests and handwriting samples, the Court has not commented 
on the intricacies of protection – sensibly, since there was no 
protection on which to  expound. And when the Court has held acts 
of production (like responses to subpoenas) protected, its opinions 
have been ambiguous.
91
 Indeed, after Muniz, the closest the Court 
has come to directly confronting the issue of what protection 
“psychological processes [deserve] independent of [] substantive 
result” is Estelle,
92
 which addressed the Fifth Amendment status of 
psychiatric evaluations. I read Estelle in some detail below. The 
short answer, however, is that it, too, hews toward a 
communication-based view of testimony.  
2. Reconstructing Estelle v. Smith 
 
The second weakness of Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s 
theories is their reliance on a tenuous metaphysical distinction 
between the content of cognition — knowledge of or believe that 
— and background states of mind like drunkenness or agitation. 
Much turns on this distinction. It is what divides the narrow variant 
of the substantive view from its wider counterpart. Indeed, absent 
this distinction, Pardo’s and Allen and Mace’s theories would 
reach all evidence that discloses something about a suspect’s 
background state of mind. Which is to say, all observations — by 
any party, and under any circumstance — that invite speculation 
about how a suspect feels (e.g., that a suspect was upset, that a 
suspect was tired, etc.) would be privileged. This understanding of 
“testimony” might be normatively endearing. But it bears no 
relation to doctrinal reality.  
                                                 
90
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 260. 
91
 Supra Part II.C 
92
 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 454 (1981) 
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Like many metaphysical distinctions, the difference 
between specifiable knowledge and beliefs, on the one hand, and 
background “states of mind,” on the other, has enormous intuitive 
appeal. Surely, the thought goes, there must be difference between 
my being angry or intoxicated, and, say, my belief that President 
Obama has done a good job as President, or my knowledge that a 
body is buried in my backyard. While types of data speak, in a 
broad sense, to my cognition, the latter, unlike the former, seems to 
be the outcome of cognitive processes – approval of President 
Obama represents a belief to which I have consciously come, just 
the presence of a body in my backyard represents a piece of 
knowledge of which I am consciously aware. However they are 
precisely characterized, the important point is that both mental 
states seem “higher level” than anger or intoxication – a 
stratification that enjoys a rich legacy in Western thought.
93
 
I reserve the fuller contours of this distinction to the 
metaphysicians.
94
 For our purposes, the important point is that at 
an evidentiary level, the boundary between higher-level cognition 
and background mental states often becomes blurry. In a particular 
way: evidence about higher-level cognition often serves as 
evidence of background mental states, or vice versa. When this 
happens, a puzzle arises: What is the test for determining if a piece 
of evidence is substantively “testimonial”? Is it whether the 
evidence records the content of higher-order knowledge or belief 
states? Or is it whether the evidence is used to demonstrate the 
existence of particular knowledge or belief states? Or, finally, must 
both elements be met simultaneously?  
To concretize this distinction, consider Estelle v. Smith. In 
Estelle, the Court held that the right to silence applies to post-
conviction psychiatric evaluations, since they compel a convicted 
suspect to make potentially incriminating disclosures.
95
 Estelle 
                                                 
93
 See Stephen Schiffer, Propositional Content, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 267 (Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith eds., 2008) 
(reviewing scholarly accounts of higher-order cognition). Something of this is 
also captured in the classic philosophical distinction between zoe and bios, 
which both translate from Greek as “life.” Zoe refers to bare life, the life of 
animals, while bios refers to the life that is particular to humans – the good life. 
In much ancient philosophy, what distinguishes bios from zoe is precisely logos, 
the capacity of human beings to rationally interpret their world. See GIORGIO 
AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (1998).   
94
 Indeed, it might be said to be a weakness, in itself, that Pardo’s and Allen and 
Mace’s theories embed a distinction that requires a large helping of metaphysics 
to parse. At the same time, of course, it is precisely distinctions like these — 
however fleeting or spurious — that lawyers are paid handsomely to draw. Cf. 
ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1992). 
95
 Because of the posture of Estelle, the Court’s holding only reached the issue 
of whether a Miranda warning was required before the evaluation. The point, 
however, stands.  
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showcases the complexity that can result from the dynamic 
between background mental states and higher-order cognition. The 
Court held the psychiatrist’s report privileged because “[his] 
diagnosis, as detailed in his testimony, was not based simply on his 
observations of respondent. Rather, [the psychiatrist] drew his 
conclusions largely from respondent’s account of the crime during 
their interview.”
96
 On the substantive view of testimony, however, 
this formulation is already ambiguous. Which is the important 
variable for determining the “testimonial substance” of the 
psychiatric evaluation, (1) the content of the psychiatrist’s report, 
or (2) the content of the conversation that took place between the 
psychiatrist and the defendant? If both the report and the 
conversation disclose higher-order cognition, or both disclose 
background mental states, there is no issue. Things get trickier, 
however, if the two are misaligned. Suppose the content of the 
psychiatrist’s report goes to a background mental state — like 
drunkenness — but the conversation between psychiatrist and 
defendant required the latter to disclose higher-order cognition. 
Which variable governs? In fact, the central question in Estelle is 
similar in posture to the sixth birthday question in Muniz. Both 
raise the question of what it means, for self-incrimination 
purposes, when higher-order cognition is used as evidence of 
background mental states.  
The psychiatric evaluation in Estelle was adduced at a post-
conviction sentencing hearing. Pursuant to Texas state law, the 
purpose of the hearing was to assess the defendant’s “future 
dangerousness.”
97
 As a matter of fact, what the psychiatrist’s 
report concluded about “future dangerousness” was that Smith, the 
defendant, “[was] a severe sociopath.”
98
 The psychiatrist cites 
many data points to support his conclusion: “[Smith] will continue 
his previous behavior” and “only get worse”; “[Smith has no] 
regard for another human being’s property or for their life, 
regardless of who it may be”; he “is going to go ahead and commit 
other similar or same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do 
so”; and he “has no remorse or sorrow for what he has done.”
99
 All 
of these discrete propositions are drawn from the psychiatric 
evaluation. In other words, they stem from Smith’s disclosure of 
his higher-order belief states to the psychiatrist. If those disclosures 
were adduced to prove the truth of their content, they would be 
undeniably “testimonial” on the narrow-substantive view of 
testimony. The difficulty is that they were not adduced to prove the 
                                                 
96
 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 464.  
97
 Estelle, 451 U.S. at 456 (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257(b)(2)(Vernon 
1974)).  
98
 Id. at 458-59.  
99
 Id. at 459-60.  
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truth of their content; they were adduced to prove that Smith, if 
released, would continue to pose a danger to society.  
How, then, should the psychiatrist’s conclusions be 
evaluated? Some of them certainly go to the content of Smith’s 
higher-order cognition — for example, that Smith lacks remorse — 
so those, presumably, should be privileged. Yet other of the 
psychiatrist’s conclusions — like the proposition that Smith is 
likely to continue his behavior in the future — are more 
ambiguous. This proposition seems to have less to do with Smith’s 
higher-order cognition (what belief or knowledge does it embed?) 
than with his general state of mind. The psychiatrist’s contention 
that Smith is likely to commit the same kinds of crime in the future 
might rely on Smith’s higher-order cognition — it was the 
psychiatrist’s construction of Smith’s disclosures that allowed him 
to reach the conclusion he did — but it is not clear that this renders 
the psychiatrist’s contention “testimonial” under the narrow-
substantive view. The Muniz case nicely illustrates this point. Both 
Pardo and Allen and Mace understand the answer to the sixth 
birthday question as non-testimonial because it is adduced to 
establish the driver’s intoxication level, not to prove anything 
about the content of the driver’s cognition. As Pardo puts it: “[the] 
answer would not be ‘testimonial’ because the content of the 
answer would not be incriminating; the question would only test 
the defendant's mental acuity at the time, which may be 
incriminating for reasons other than content.”
100
 On this 
interpretation, what matters is whether a piece of evidence (in this 
case, the answer “No, I don’t [know]”) is used to demonstrate the 
existence of a particular knowledge or belief state; that the 
evidence records the content of a suspect’s belief or knowledge is 
insufficient, on its own, to render the evidence testimonial.  
Fair enough – but now Muniz and Estelle have splintered 
apart. When the psychiatrist relied on Smith’s higher-order 
disclosures to conclude that he is likely to commit crimes in the 
future, I fail to see a distinction between this — in terms of its 
formal operation — and the police officer relying on the driver’s 
higher-order disclosures to conclude that he is drunk. To be clear, 
on the actual facts of Estelle, the psychiatrist’s evaluation did 
report Smith’s higher-order mental states – I am not saying, 
therefore, that the holding in Estelle is irreconcilable with the 
narrow-substantive view. What I am saying is that a slightly 
modified version of the psychiatric evaluation, one that involves 
only conclusions that go to background mental states, poses a 
problem for the narrow-substantive view. Imagine a psychiatric 
report that simply concludes a defendant is “unstable” and “likely 
                                                 
100
 Pardo, supra note 40, at 331.  
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to commit felonies in the future.” Imagine, further, that this report 
is based on a lengthy interview with a suspect — which required 
the suspect to disclose the content of his higher-order cognition — 
but that no mention is made, in the report itself, of the content of 
those disclosures.  
Here, just as in the sixth birthday question from Muniz, a 
record of higher-order cognition would be used to establish the 
existence of a background mental state. What, then, should we 
make of this hypothetical psychiatric report?
101
 If it is 
impermissible, then I fail to see how the answer to the sixth 
birthday question can be permissible. On Pardo’s and Allen and 
Mace’s account, both should be problematic for the same reason, 
namely, that they use the substance of a suspect’s disclosures 
against him, to infer something about his background mental state. 
If, on the other hand, the hypothetical psychiatric report is 
permissible, the underlying metric of “testimony” has subtly 
transformed. Substance has given way to function: testimony does 
not turn on what type of mental state (background or higher-order) 
a piece of evidence records, but rather, on whether the purpose of 
the evidence is to establish the existence of higher-order mental 
states. Resolving one problem, however, this solution produces 
another. Namely, if the state may use a defendant’s higher-order 
knowledge and belief against him as long as it is for the purpose of 
establishing background mental states, then any method of seizing 
cognitive evidence — including the Mind Reader Machine — 
ought to be allowed. In other words, if the privilege is construed to 
reach the use rather than the content of propositional mental states, 
the narrow-substantive view is really no argument against mind-
reading. It is an argument, rather, about how evidence procured 
from a Mind Reader Machine can be used. For example, it would 
be permissible on this view to use the Machine to determine 
whether a suspect is intelligent or has a learning disorder, since 
both of these are background mental states, not higher-order 
knowledge or belief. And it would also be permissible to use the 
Machine to find out incriminating physical information – for 
example, that the suspect’s right fist hurts (in, say, an assault case) 
or that he recently had plastic surgery (in a case where identity is 
under dispute).  
In short, if “testimony” turns on what a piece of evidence 
causes a finder of fact to infer, rather than the knowledge or belief 
states that the evidence records, all of these uses of the Mind 
Reader Machine — and presumably a great many others — would 
                                                 
101
 Notably, it is only “hypothetical” in its specific contours, not its essence – it 
shares a conceptual core with the actual report from Estelle. See infra Part II.E.  
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 And if the opposite is true, and testimony turns on 
what a piece of evidence records, then the sixth birthday question 
from Muniz cannot possibly be allowed. Either way, proponents of 
the narrow-substantive view have much to explain. 
3. Shoring Up the Communication-Based View 
 
Keeping all of the foregoing in mind, I now reconstruct the 
communication-based view of testimony more carefully. As a 
preliminary matter, it bears noting that the communication-based 
view effortlessly predicts the holdings of both Estelle and Muniz: 
both the psychiatric evaluation and the answer to the sixth birthday 
question are problematic because they force the suspect to engage 
in a potentially incriminating communicative act, namely, verbally 
reporting the results of his higher-order cognition.
103
 What is more, 
the communication-based view would predict that Muniz is a far 
more difficult case than Estelle, since the “communicative act” in 
Muniz could easily be re-described as non-communicative while 
the equivalent act in Estelle could not. In other words, there is 
room within the communication-based interpretation of testimony 
to interrogate what counts as “communication” – and it is easy to 
see how Chief Justice Rehnquist and his co-dissenters decided that 
the driver’s answer to a programmatic question like “Do you know 
the date of your sixth birthday?” is best understood as non-
communicative, the equivalent of participating in a line-up and 
being forced to read from a script.
104
  In Estelle, by contrast, the 
psychiatric evaluation unquestionably required the suspect to 
engage in communicative acts; the very purpose of the 
examination was to induce Smith to share his experience with the 
psychiatrist, in dialogue form. This clearly falls within the 
privilege’s scope.   
If the communication-based view renders Muniz a closer 
case than Estelle — just as the Court’s composition of opinions 
attested to — it also predicts that Estelle would become far more 
difficult if the psychiatrist observed Smith in silence instead of 
                                                 
102
 This view may be conceptually sound, but it plainly fails to capture the 
intuition that Pardo and Allen and Mace mean to vindicate. See, e.g., Allen and 
Mace, supra note 9, at 248-49 (painting a hypothetical Mind Reader Machine 
scenario in which only physiological data is extracted).    
103
 Of course, for Fifth Amendment purposes, it would not have to be “speech” 
in the sense of a fully formed verbal act. It could be any form of gesture or 
conveyance. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967) 
(describing the privilege as extending to “an accused’s ‘communications’ in 
whatever form, vocal or physical”) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 
757, 764 (1966)).   
104
 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 607 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part).   
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asking him verbal questions. This would be a more difficult case 
because it would less clear, under those facts, that a 
“communicative act” had transpired. This prediction, too, is borne 
out by Estelle. The Court’s opinion rests on the view that the 
psychiatrist’s observations “[were] not based simply on his 
observation of respondent,” but rather, on listening to “[Smith’s] 
account of the crime during their interview.”
105
 In crafting this 
conclusion, the Court explored the possibility that had the 
psychiatrist merely observed Smith, the analysis might be different 
for Fifth Amendment purposes.
106
 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, in its 
opinion below, suggested explicitly that if the psychiatrist had 
simply “drawn his conclusion from Smith’s manner or deportment, 
his attention span or facial expressions,” the evidence would likely 
pose no Fifth Amendment problem.
107
  
The Estelle Court neither endorsed nor disparaged the Fifth 
Circuit’s view; it left the matter unresolved.
108
 But this, in and of 
itself, is salient. That the Court recognized a doctrinally 
meaningful distinction between cognitive evidence drawn from 
observation and cognitive evidence drawn from communicative 
acts already suggests the cogence of the communication-based 
view of testimony. Pardo and Allen and Mace both seek refuge in 
the Estelle Court’s use of the term “substance” in the following 
statement of law: “[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege . . . is directly 
involved here because the State used as evidence against 
respondent the substance of his disclosures during the pretrial 
psychiatric examination.” This statement, however, is ambiguous 
all the way down – the phrase “the substance of his disclosures” 
integrates both interpretations of testimony, since it invokes both 
substance and communication (“disclosures”) simultaneously. 
Does the Court mean that the psychiatric evaluation was 
problematic because it disclosed the content of Smith’s mental 
states — as the word “substance” implies — or does it mean that 
the evaluation was problematic because it required Smith himself 
to disclose his mental states — as the word “disclosures” implies? 
The former interpretation would bar the evaluation outright, 
regardless of the method by which Smith’s mental states were 
                                                 
105
 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 464 (1981).  
106
 In other words, the Court accepted the government’s theory that observational 
evidence is non-testimonial; it simply disagreed with the application of that 
standard.  
107
 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 704 (5th Cir. 1979). 
108
 It did raise concerns, briefly, about the reliability of purely observational 
evidence. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 472. But these concerns, of course, are 
inapplicable to the Mind Reader Machine; they pertain to exactly the 
shortcoming the Mind Reader Machine is supposed to help overcome.  
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recorded; the latter interpretation would only bar an evaluation that 
required Smith to offer his mental states for recording.  
The Court’s treatment of the “observation-only” 
hypothetical cuts strongly in favor the latter interpretation. If the 
point of Estelle were what Pardo and Allen and Mace suggest — 
that any evidence from a psychiatric evaluation that discloses the 
suspect’s mental states is disallowed — the Court’s discussion of 
the difference between observation and communication would be 
in vain.
109
 It would not be necessary to even flirt with this 
distinction, because on the substantive view, nothing turns on it. 
Whether or not the suspect is communicating anything when the 
psychiatrist observes him, the extracted evidence — the 
psychiatrist’s report — certainly discloses the suspect’s 
cognition.
110
 That is just the point: the psychiatrist’s skills are 
being used precisely to interpret something about the suspect’s 
mental world.  
To support the construction of Estelle as supportive of their 
substantive view, Allen and Mace cite to South Dakota v. Neville, a 
case that came down two years after Estelle. The question 
presented in Neville was whether it violated the Fifth Amendment 
for the state to introduce a suspect’s refusal to submit to a 
voluntary blood sample as incriminating evidence.
111
 Justice 
O’Conner wrote for the Court; in dictum, she invoked the 
psychiatric evaluation in Estelle as an example of “of seemingly 
physical evidence that nevertheless invokes Fifth Amendment 
protection.”
112
 According to Justice O’Conner, the Estelle Court 
“specifically rejected the claim that the psychiatrist was observing 
the patient's communications simply to infer facts of his mind, 
rather than to examine the truth of the patient's statements.”
113
  
It is easy to see why Allen and Mace take Justice 
O’Conner’s words to bolster their substantive view. She appears to 
be saying that psychiatric examinations pique Fifth Amendment 
scrutiny insofar as they go to the content — in Allen and Mace’s 
vernacular, the “substance” — of the suspect’s disclosures. As they 
put it, while the information extracted from the psychiatric 
                                                 
109
 It is a well-established canon of construction that legal texts ought to be 
construed in a manner that renders inclusions meaningful rather than redundant. 
See, e.g., Nancy Staudt, Judging Statutes: Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1909, 1932-34 (2005).  
110
 The same ambiguity from above, of course, is reproduced here. Do the 
psychiatrist’s observations go to the content of the suspect’s cognition, or only 
to his background mental states? I examine this issue more fully in the next 
Section, when I explore the full implications of the analogy between the Mind 
Reader Machine and the observation-only psychiatric exam. See infra Part II.E.     
111
 South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).  
112
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evaluation “could be considered medical like the blood in 
Schmerber,” the privilege “is still implicated [because the suspect] 
is compelled to compare the meaning of the doctor’s statements 
with his own knowledge and experiences and to arrive at 
incriminating substantive answers which are then extracted 
through compulsion.”
114
 And the Neville Court, Allen and Mace 




This reading, however, imputes to Justice O’Conner’s 
words an ambition they do not independently embed. Her claim is 
not about the status of psychiatric evaluations in general. Rather, it 
goes to — and is constrained by — the specific facts of Estelle. It 
is true that in that case, the Court “specifically rejected the claim 
that the psychiatrist was observing the patient's communications 
simply to infer facts of his mind.”
116
 But that is because the 
psychiatrist in Estelle, as matter of fact, did not just observe the 
patient – he talked to the patient, and he based his conclusions on 
what the patient communicated. The more important point is that 
the Estelle Court did not foreclose the possibility of an 
observation-only psychiatric evaluation. It precisely invited that 
possibility. Allen and Mace thus have the point backwards: by 
“reject[ing] the claim that the psychiatrist was observing the 
patient’s communications simply to infer the facts of his mind,” 
Estelle did not settle the issue of observation-only psychiatric 
evaluations. Just the opposite: Estelle implies that if the 
psychiatrist had observed the patient simply to infer the facts of his 
mind, the case might resolve differently. 
I am not saying that it follows from Estelle that an 
observation-only psychiatric examination poses no Fifth 
Amendment concerns. I am saying that in contemplating the 
difference between the two scenarios — observation-only 
psychiatric exams and other psychiatric exams — the Court makes 
clear that the salient variable is the presence or absence of 
communication. It is still possible of course, that even an 
observation-only evaluation would be construed to involve 
communication, in which case it would trigger the privilege – but 
the inquiry would differ materially from the way that Allen and 
Mace imagine. Consider the Fifth Circuit’s opinion below in 
Estelle, which explores the practical implications of the 
observation-only distinction more fully. To illustrate the issue 
posed by the observation-only exam, the Fifth Circuit sketches a 
spectrum of communicative acts. It suggested (1) that a 
                                                 
114
 Allen & Mace, supra note 9, at 269.  
115
 Id.  
116
 Nieville, 459 U.S. at 562 n.12. 
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psychiatrist’s conclusion drawn only from “manner or deportment, 
[] attention span or facial expressions” would most likely be 
admissible under the Fifth Amendment; (2) that an equivalent 
conclusion drawn from “the patterns of the defendant’s speech, his 
grammar, organization, logical coherence, and similar qualities” 
would be a “closer [question],” but that “arguably the Fifth 
Amendment would still not apply”; and finally (3) that an 
equivalent conclusion drawn from “the content of [a suspect’s] 
statements” — as in the actual facts of Estelle — would be 
privileged.
117
 As surely as these categories would be difficult to 
apply in practice,
118
 their basic orientation is clear: for the Fifth 
Circuit explicitly, and the Supreme Court implicitly, evidence from 
a psychiatric examination should be judged on the basis of the type 
of communication, if any, that it requires from a suspect.
119
   
E. Applying the Communication-Based View to the Mind 
Reader Machine 
 
Even if I am right, and the communication-based view of 
testimony prevails over its substantive counterpart, the next 
question is obvious: for Fifth Amendment purposes, what counts as 
“communication”? Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
“communication” as “the sharing of knowledge by one with 
another.”
120
 This definition comports with the gloss that the Court 
has given “communication.” To count as a “testimonial,” 
communication must either “relate a factual assertion or disclose 
information.”
121
 It is clear, moreover, that “sharing” is the key 
component of this definition. What is it to share knowledge? The 
Schmerber plurality, for its part, suggested that communication 
necessarily involves “participation” from the suspect.
122
 It also 
                                                 
117
 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694, 704 (5th Cir. 1979).  
118
 I take this up in the next Section. Infra Part II.E.  
119
 See also Jones v. Dugger, 839 F.2d 1441, 1443-46 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding 
that a detective’s observational evidence of a defendant’s sanity level did not 
violate the Fifth Amendment because it was based solely on observations); 
Cunningham v. Perini, 655 F.2d 98 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that it was 
permissible for a prosecutor to reference the defendant’s reaction to in-court 
testimony, even if that reaction might lead to an incriminating inference about 
the defendant’s decision not to testify on his own behalf, because the 
prosecutor’s reference was purely observational); Mauro v. State, 766 P.2d 59, 
69 (Ariz. 1988) (incorporating Jones and Cunningham to hold that a sanity 
determination based on a psychiatrist’s observations did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment).  
120
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 349 (4th ed. 1968). 
121
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (citing Doe v. United States, 487 
U.S. 201, 210 (1988))  
122
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966). 
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made reference to a suspect’s “testimonial capacities,”
123
 an 
invocation that Sarah Stoller and Paul Wolpe have read to imply 
that “the suspect must have some sort of control over the 
information [he or she communicates] in order to implicate the 
privilege against self-incrimination.”
124
 I agree with this inference. 
In a similar vein, the Muniz plurality held that to be “testimonial,” 
communication must reflect a “volitional act on the part of the 
suspect,”
125
 which Dov Fox has interpreted to mean that “evidence 
[counts] as “testimonial” only when it conveys a suspect's intention 
to communicate her thoughts.”
126
 Again, I agree. Finally, similar 
principles are at play in the act of production cases. In the words of 
the Hubbell Court, by producing documents in compliance with a 
subpoena, a suspect would, by his own volition, “admit that the 




These fragments orbit an elusive center. Indeed, it is 
precisely because the formal contours of “testimonial 
communication” remain so obscure that the Mind Reader Machine 
poses such a fruitful thought experiment for self-incrimination. 
Synthesizing the various strands of case law and scholarly 
commentary, I propose the following definition: to be 
“testimonial,” communication must stem from an intentional act on 
the suspect’s part that discloses information about the suspect’s 
mental states.
128
 This definition has three basic parts. First, the act 
must be intentional. The suspect does not necessarily have to 
intend to disclose the thing disclosed, but the disclosing act does 
have to be intentional; it cannot be unconscious. Second, the act 
must in actuality assert or disclose something. Third, the assertion 
or disclosure must reveal the content of the suspect’s mind.   
I have tried to render this definition as innocuously as 
possible, erring on the side of broadness. If the scope of intention 
were changed slightly, so that testimony required the suspect not 




 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 368.  
125
 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 591.  
126
 Fox, supra note 5, at 765.  
127
 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).  
128
 And per the doctrinal status quo, “communication” would not be limited to 
verbalizations. It would, rather, encompass the whole gamut of possible 
communicative acts. See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 122 (1988) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Those assertions [contained within the act of 
producing subpoenaed documents] can convey information about that 
individual's knowledge and state of mind as effectively as spoken statements, 
and the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from having such assertions 
compelled by their own acts”); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n.5 (“A nod or head-
shake is as much a ‘testimonial’ or ‘communicative’ act in this sense as are 
spoken words.”). 
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only to act intentionally, but also to intend specifically to disclose 
the factual assertion or information disclosed, I might be 
reasonably accused of stacking the deck in my favor. On this type 
of narrower definition — which would only trigger the privilege in 
case of communicative acts that intend to convey exactly what they 
in fact convey to the listener — it would be substantially harder to 
characterize evidence from the Machine as “testimonial,” since 
testimony would turn on the suspect’s intention to disclose in the 
context of a mostly involuntary act.
129
 More importantly, this 
narrower definition would fail, in my view, to capture the 
proposition at the heart of the Court’s act of production cases. As I 
read Hubbell, the point was not that by complying with the 
subpoena, the defendant necessarily intended to disclose 
potentially incriminating information about the “existence, 
custody, and authenticity of [] documents.”
130
 The point, rather, 
was that by acting intentionally to produce the documents, per the 
subpoena’s dictate, the defendant’s intentional act of compliance 
ended up disclosing incriminating content about his mental 
states.
131
 In other words, the Court was concerned that whether or 
not Mr. Hubbell, in complying with subpoena order, intended to 
communicate knowledge about the alleged crime, the fact that he 
was able to consolidate the documents required by the subpoena — 
an indisputably intentional act — implies such knowledge. There 
was not necessarily a causal relationship between intention and 
                                                 
129
 The problems associated with this view would not be solely jurisprudential. 
The question of where to localize meaning, as between the speaker and the 
listener, has long plagued linguistic theory. See, e.g., JOHN SEARLE, SPEECH 
ACTS: AN ESSAY ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (1969). As it stands, the 
question is a much closer one, namely, whether responsiveness to the Mind 
Reader Machine counts as an intentional act. I discuss this in the next Section. 
See infra Section III. 
130
 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 37-38. 
131
 Michael Pardo has argued quite compellingly that the Hubbell Court departs 
from an analytically murky conception of “testimony.” See Pardo, supra note 
36, at 184-88. Pardo argues, inter alia, that the Court erroneously focuses on 
how much the act of document production required the suspect to “use his mind” 
rather than on the testimonial nature (or lack thereof) of the disclosures. Id. at 
184-85. Cf. Geyh, supra note 64, at 634-36 (arguing that the physical-
testimonial distinction has painted the Court into the strange position of 
inquiring after how much testimony is “sufficient” to trigger the privilege). 
Pardo’s argument is rigorous and elegant – more rigorous, in every meaningful 
sense, than the Court’s words. But be that as it may, Pardo’s point is essentially 
academic; the spirit of the Hubbell Court’s holding is obvious: how precisely or 
imprecisely the point is expressed, the Court believes that (and is concerned in 
their belief that) compliance with subpoena required an intentional act of 
information disclosure on the suspect’s part – i.e., testimony. My view, in other 
words, is that the Hubbell Court can accommodate the whole of Pardo’s 
epistemological critique without unsettling its doctrinal result.   
34
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communication; it was sufficient for the two to simply be 
coterminous in the same act of production.  
This definition of “testimonial communication” also 
explains the three most important data points in the case law: 
Shmerber and the exemplar cases, Muniz, and Estelle. With respect 
to Schmerber — and all the exemplar cases — the definition is 
easy to apply. The act of, say, offering a blood sample is an 
intentional act, and it does disclose information (the information 
contained in the suspect’s blood), but the disclosure does not 
reflect the content of the suspect’s mind.
132
 The blood itself might 
allow fact-finders to draw an inference about the suspect’s mind, 
but the act of disclosure — that is, sitting for the blood sample — 
does not intrinsically convey information about the suspect’s mind. 
In both Muniz and Estelle, by contrast, the defendants were 
compelled to engage in intentional acts that disclosed information 
about their mental states. In Muniz, this act was answering the 
sixth birthday question. In Estelle, it was answering the 
psychiatrist’s questions during an evaluation.      
Under the communication-based view, the Mind Reader 
Machine is similar to purely “observational” psychiatric exams. 
That is to say, the status of the evidence under the Fifth 
Amendment is not obvious one way or another – and the answer 
turns on distinctions of a finer grain than treatment of mind-
reading has thus far inspired. When it comes to observation-only 
psychiatric evaluations, lower courts have adopted different 
analytical frames and come to different conclusions about their 
constitutional status. For example, in Gholson v. Estelle, the Fifth 
Circuit interpreted an observation-only examination to trigger the 
privilege, focusing on the fact that the exam was conducted in 
order to produce physiological responses as a stand-in for verbal 
disclosures; the psychiatrist interrogated the suspect and then 
observed his physiological responses, much in the same way a 
sophisticated polygraph would.
133
 For the Fifth Circuit, these 
physiological responses, despite being in some sense purely 
“physical,” were in fact “testimonial in nature.”
134
 The 
                                                 
132
 It is possible, of course, to argue that a suspect’s compliance with a blood 
test, in addition to disclosing the information contained in his blood, also 
discloses his ability to comply with the test, which goes to the suspect’s mental 
state (e.g., that he has enough knowledge of the English language to understand 
the sentence “please lift your arm”). See Geyh, supra note 64, at 614-15 
(characterizing virtually every act as “communicative”). To be sure, any act can 
be re-characterized as a “disclosure” of the ability to perform that act – but that 
just abuses the English language. Certain acts are disclosures (they stem from 
intentional, communicative origins) and others are not.  
133
 Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1982).  
134
 Id. at 740.  
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Six years later, Jones v. Dugger provided a 
counterexample. In Dugger, Eleventh Circuit — following Fifth 
Circuit precedent — held that an observation-only psychiatric 
evaluation did not trigger self-incrimination concerns.
136
 It 
distinguished Gholson on the grounds that in that case, the 
questioning had been designed to elicit physiological responses as 
a substitute for internal thoughts, whereas in Dugger, the 
psychiatrist had simply observed the defendant’s demeanor during 
conversation.
137
 It was crucial to the Eleventh Circuit that none of 
the defendant’s disclosures — only the psychiatrist’s observations 
of his behavior — were used as incriminating evidence. Had the 
former been adduced, the court reasoned, the privilege would have 
triggered.
138
 In drawing this conclusion, the court specifically 
relied on the words of the Estelle Court, which it understood — as 
I outlined above — to draw a constitutionally salient distinction 
between observation-only evaluations and evaluations (like in 
Estelle) that require a suspect to verbally disclose his thoughts.
139
  
Doctrinally, the governing question in both cases was 
whether the psychiatric evaluation required the defendant to 
engage in a “testimonial communication.” Synthesizing the cases 
together, and reading them through Estelle, three typologies of 
psychiatric evaluation emerge. The first is a regular evaluation: a 
conversation between patient and psychiatrist which allows the 
psychiatrist, relying on the patient’s disclosures, to draw 
conclusions about the patient’s mental state. This version plainly 
triggers the privilege. The second version is an observation-only 
evaluation that is designed to provoke physiological responses in 
the patient that stand-in for propositional disclosures. Under 
current Fifth Circuit law, this version also triggers the privilege. 
And the third version is an observation-only evaluation that is not 
                                                 
135
 Id. at 741.  
136
 Jones v. Dugger, 839 F.2d 1441 (5th Cir. 1988). 
137
 Id. at 1444 n. 7. 
138
 Id. at 1444 (“[U]nlike the testimony of the examining physician in Estelle v. 
Smith that he based his conclusions on the details of the story that Smith had 
told him, [the psychiatrist] gave no indication that his opinion of Jones’ sanity 
was grounded in the details of Jones’ statement.”).  
139
 Id. at 1445. The Dugger court embarks on a long genealogy of the relevant 
case law over the course of crafting its distinction between different types of 
observation-only evaluations. See id. at 1444 n.7; see also Muniz v. Procunier, 
760 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1985) (replicating the holding of apropos of a 
psychiatric evaluation that, in the court’s estimation, was clearly intended to 
elicit communicative physiological responses). Cf. United States v. Byers, 740 
F.2d 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence from a psychiatric evaluation 
may be used, even if it would violate the Fifth Amendment, to rebut an insanity 
defense).  
36
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 15 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol15/iss2/3
15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 214 (2013)      2012-2013 
 
 250 
designed to provoke surrogate-thought responses, but rather 
involves neutral observation. Under Dugger, this version does not 
trigger the privilege.  
The lines separating these typologies of psychiatric 
evaluation, far from being settled, are ripe for debate. Whatever 
view one ultimately takes, it seems fair to say that observation-
only psychiatric examinations provide an apt analogy for mind-
reading. Both extract cognitive evidence from suspects who are not 
voluntarily sharing it, at least not in the form of self-reporting, and 
in both cases, the relevant doctrinal question is whether the 
mechanism, although it clearly does not involve “communication” 
in the everyday sense of verbal activity, induces a “communicative 
act” on the suspect’s part. That is, would an observation-only 
psychiatric evaluation, and likewise would the Mind Reader 
Machine, cause the suspect to engage in an intentional act that 
discloses information about his mental states? Of those three 
variables — intentionality, disclosure, and mental states — the 
confusing variable is intentionality. It is far from clear whether the 
suspect, in submitting to the Mind Reader Machine, is forced to 
engage in an intentional act. At least with respects to certain 
versions of the Machine, I believe the answer to be no. In other 
words, I believe there are uses of the Machine that involve no 
intentional communication and thus, on the definition I have 
proposed, are not “testimonial” for self-incrimination purposes.     
 




First scenario (“dream-catcher”): The government devises a 
machine that is able to capture the content of a suspect’s dreams 
while he sleeps. Assuming arguendo that the captured dream-
content, as well as the subsequent interpretation of that content, is 
reliable, the government plans to use the captured dream-content as 
evidence about already-committed crimes.    
Second scenario (“basic polygraph”): The government devises a 
machine that takes detailed biometric data from suspects – data 
designed to measure stress, agitation, involuntary responsiveness, 
etc.
141
 When the police hook up a suspect to the machine and ask 
him questions, his body will provide them (involuntarily) with 
information that may be germane to his guilt.   
Third scenario (“smart polygraph”): Same as the third scenario, 
except that instead of taking biometric data, the machine can 
                                                 
140
 These are roughly patterned on the gradient of existing technology. See supra 
note 4.    
141
 This is almost exactly the hypothetical that Allen and Mace lay out. See Allen 
& Mace, supra note 9. It is also very similar to a traditional polygraph.  
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“read” the content of cognition in real time. When a suspect is 
hooked up to the machine and asked questions, the police will 
enjoy full access to his thoughts – though there is no guarantee that 
the thoughts are truthful.  
Fourth scenario (“digital serum”): The government devises a 
machine that hooks up to a suspect’s brain and, at the flip of a 
switch, makes synapses fire in the suspect’s brain that replicate the 
neuronal patterns of the mental states corresponding to 
“interpretation,” “answer formulation,” and “truthful disclosure.” 
If a police officer asks a suspect a question and then flips the 
switch, the suspect will have no choice — because of the 
machine’s synaptic effect — but to interpret the question and to 
answer truthfully.  
Of these scenarios, only the basic polygraph is remotely 
possible at present.
142
 Each scenario, however, presents novel and 
interesting issues, and each contributes to the overall construction 
of the Fifth Amendment. The first and the last, in particular, help 
to clarify our intuitions about what it means, or could mean, for a 
suspect to engage in a communicative act. How would each fare 
under the definition of “testimonial communication” above? In my 
view, evidence gathered by the dream-catcher would clearly be 
non-testimonial; there is no coherent sense in which it forces the 
suspect to engage in an intentional act. By the same token, it seems 
to me that the digital serum would likewise produce only non-




In any event, the dream-catcher and the digital serum are 
fanciful thought-experiment, the stuff of science fiction. The 
polygraph scenarios, by contrast, simultaneously loom closest to 
reality and present the most perplexing type of middle case. These 
are scenarios in which the suspect does not appear to be 
“communicating” because his disclosures are not, in the usual 
sense, intentional.
144
 At the same time, there is a nagging sense that 
the disclosures at some level require the suspect’s participation – 
he does, after all, have be conscious, awake, and thinking for the 
extraction to work. Examining an fMRI scanner analogous to 
polygraphs imagined above, Sean Thompson observes that 
although “[t]he [suspect] may be restrained and forced into an 
fMRI scanner,” he is “not in any common sense ‘forced' to do 
                                                 
142
 See, e.g., Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 360-64.  
143
 Of course, it is also possible to imagine arguments that cut exactly the 
opposite way, construing the digital serum hypothetical as the most 
unacceptable incarnation of “mind-reading,” insofar as it induces, by necessity, 
a communicative act. This depends, once again, on the elements of 
“communication.” 
144
 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 5, at 792-93.   
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anything else, as the reactions measured are involuntary.”
145
 
Therefore, despite the “temptation” to conclude that the scanner 
“violat[es] [the suspect’s] thoughts,” it is “hard to avoid the 
characterization that an fMRI scanner is acquiring physical 
evidence because that is, in fact, what it is doing.”
146
 Stoller and 
Wolpe reach a similar result. They tread cautiously, due to the fact 
that “[p]ast judicial decisions and legal commentaries do not 
present a clear answer as to whether [brain imaging] would be 
covered by the Fifth Amendment's protection.”
147
 But they 
conclude, nonetheless, that on either a “communicative act” theory 
of the privilege or a theory focused on “the control the suspect has 




Matthew Holloway, for his part, disagrees. Contra 
Thompson and Stoller and Wolpe, Holloway argues that the kind 
of brain activity produced by the polygraph scenarios would be 
“communicative” in nature.
149
 On scrutiny, however, it becomes 
clear that Holloway’s metric is substantive, not communication-
based. He argues that criminal suspects “should be able to invoke 
the privilege and prevent the government from compelling 
participation in a brain scan” because “[brain-imaging] technology 
allows [] physical operations to be expressed to third parties in a 
manner that discloses a suspect’s beliefs and knowledge.”
150
 
Holloway therefore believes the Mind Reader Machine runs afoul 
of the Fifth Amendment for the same reason that Pardo and Allen 
and Mace do: he is focused on what extracted evidence records, 
instead of the process by which it is recorded. 
In erring, Holloway’s analysis is instructive, for it makes 
clear what communication is not. The central problem with his 
view is that it conflates “being stimulated” with “engaging in 
communication” – that is, it takes the presence of mental 
stimulation to imply an occurrence of a communicative act. But 
this difference makes all the difference. There can be no doubt that 
the Mind Reader Machine, even in its lighter variants, records 
stimulation. That is the point of the Machine: it allows law 
enforcement to parse how a suspect responds internally or 
physiologically to different stimuli. But what does the presence of 
stimulation mean doctrinally? For Holloway, stimulation is what 
separates brain-imaging from physical evidence. Physical 
evidence, he says, is “stagnant,” while evidence from brain-
                                                 
145
 Thompson, supra note 4, at 346-47.  
146
 Id. at 349.  
147
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 374.  
148
 Id.  
149
 See Holloway, supra note 4, at 166-74.  
150
 Id. at 169 (emphasis added).  
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imaging is “stimulus specific; it varies according to what stimuli 
are shown.”
151
 This, surely, is true. Less sure is its implication. 
From the observation that brain activity “is not a stagnant physical 
characteristic but a dynamic process” — because it changes with 
shifts in stimuli — Holloway infers that evidence of brain activity 
(i.e., brain-imaging) “communicates information.”
152
 It is, 
Holloway writes, the “stimulus specificity of changes” that “allows 
[brain-imaging] to communicate information concerning the 
beliefs and knowledge of the suspect.” Therefore, brain-imaging 
evidence is “communicative” and, by extension, protected.
153
  
Here, however, Holloway employs the term 
“communication” quite differently than the Court does. His 
description casts evidence as “communicative” insofar as a viewer 
is able to interpret it. But this is backwards. For the Fifth 
Amendment purposes, the Court has made clear that 
“communication” turns on the role the communicating subject 
plays, not the role the listening or observing subject plays. 
Holloway’s view is that brain-imaging evidence is communicative 
because (a) it changes dynamically in response to different stimuli, 
and (b) a viewer can interpret content from those changes. But 
these conditions are insufficient. As for (b), the observer’s role is 
irrelevant, and as for (a), the “dynamism” of evidence goes only to 
the presence of stimulation. An act of communication requires 
something more than the presence of stimulation. It requires 
intention on the suspect’s part; it requires him to convey 
information, above and beyond being stimulated in a way that 
simply produces information. The way the Court uses the term, as 
I demonstrated above, communication requires an intentional act 
from the suspect. By (wrongly) defining communication otherwise, 
Holloway’s argument implicitly highlights the importance of 
intentionality in communication: it is what distinguishes an act of 
communication from the mere presence of stimulation. Both may 
appear the same from an observer’s perspective, just as a blood 
sample might suggest intoxication to the same effect that asking a 
suspect about his sixth birthday does. But that is exactly the point 
                                                 
151
 Id. at 169-70.  
152
 Id. at 170. 
153
 Id. This “stimulus specificity” conception of “communication” invites an 
amusing reductio. Holloway’s proposition that a suspect has engaged in a 
“communicative act” by submitting physical evidence of brain activity cannot be 
kept distinct, by its own lights, from the proposition that the physical evidence 
of brain activity is itself engaged in a “communicative act.” If that were so, the 
logic would presumably apply to any piece of physical evidence that (a) 
discloses information about a suspect’s mental states and (b) has the trait of 
“stimulus specificity.” Blood swirling around in a test tube, for example, would 
be “communicating” on Holloway’s theory. Not only does this fail to sustain the 
relevant doctrinal boundary; it also fails the threshold test of semantic absurdity.   
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of the communication-based view. It does not turn on substantive 
output. It turns on the process of disclosure.  
Of course, the distinction between communication and 
stimulation provides no standalone justification for the Mind 
Reader Machine. The distinction must be applied. To do so, the 
operative question is whether the production of biometric data (in 
the basic polygraph scenario), or the triggering of mental states (in 
the smart polygraph scenario), involves an intentional act on the 
suspect’s part. In both cases, the suspect would produce 
information, but in neither case would the production be 
“intentional.” The results would not be the product of his will; they 
would be the product, precisely, of his un-willed response. Another 
way to put the same point is to say that no aspect of the basic 
polygraph or the smart polygraph is forced on the suspect. To be 
forced is to have one’s volition redirected. It makes sense to say, 
“When the sun became too bright, I was forced to close to eyes,” 
because by that I mean, a change in external circumstances made it 
necessary for me, as a willing agent, to intentionally close my eyes. 
It does not make sense, by contrast, to say, “When the doctor hit 
my knee with her mallet, I was forced to lift my leg.” If the doctor 
hits my knee with a mallet, I do lift my leg – but “force” does not 
perspicuously describe why. The same is true of the polygraph 
scenarios: in both cases, the suspect experiences stimulation in 
response to external stimuli (e.g., the police officer’s questions), 
but in neither case is he forced to engage in an intentional act. 
Therefore, because it involves no intention, the act of producing 
evidence in the polygraph scenario is not “communicative.” So it is 
unprotected.  
Arguments the other way are imaginable, but they face a 
steep upward grade. To claim that either polygraph scenario 
involves communication on the suspect’s part requires showing 
that the involuntary responses they produce are “intentional.” What 
would this mean? The Gholson court provided one version of this 
argument when it held that an observation-only psychiatric 
evaluation in fact required the suspect to engage in acts of 
“communication.”
154
 Although those acts were “physiological” in 
nature, the Gholson court concluded that they stemmed from the 
suspect’s “testimonial capacities.”
155
 It is unclear exactly what the 
Fifth Circuit has in mind here – and the mere fact that the Fifth 
Circuit wrote it does not, of course, make it conceptually sound. In 
any case, a fuller version of the argument would likely fall along 
the following lines. Unwilled responses from a suspect can 
constitute “communicative acts” if those responses are understood 
                                                 
154
 Gholson v. Estelle, 675 F.2d 734, 740 (5th Cir. 1982). 
155
 Id.  
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to involve inherent “intentionality.” For this to be true, the  
underlying theory of intention would have to be something like 
this: I act intentionally whenever my heart begins to race, or 
whenever a thought flashes through my mind, regardless of 
whether these outcomes stem from my will. In other words, the 
theory of intentionality must be one that makes it possible to speak 
coherently of intentionality that inheres in the background mental 
and physical processes, rather than acting as the causal impetus for 
mental and physical processes. Thus, my heart racing, or a thought 
flashing through my mind, could be “intentional” acts, even if they 
do not stem from “intention” in the everyday sense. This view is 
certainly not indefensible, but it is counterintuitive. And it strikes a 
dissonant chord against the backdrop of criminal laws that 
distinguish so sharply between actions and intentions.
156
  
Ultimately, I am not trying to suggest that it is easy to 
define the formal elements of a “communicative act.” Nor am I 
trying to suggest that it will be easy to apply that definition, once 
formulated, to specific types of mind-reading devices. What I am 
suggesting is that (a) it is certainly not self-evident that mind-
reading devices would induce “communicative acts” in a sense 
germane to the Fifth Amendment, and furthermore (b) to my mind, 
the argument runs more intuitively the other way. In any case, 
whatever conclusions one draws about the hypothetical devices 
discussed in this section, my aim is not to resolve the controversy 
surrounding mind-reading devices once and for all. It is to 
highlight, going forward, how factually and technologically 
specific we should expect the constitutional analysis of such 
devices to be – and by implication, how poorly suited the 
categorical approaches offered by other scholars have been to the 
actual task at hand.  
 
III.  JETTISONING THE NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS  
 
Having laid out my doctrinal claim, I now turn to the 
normative arguments against the Mind Reader Machine. Even if 
my construction of the doctrine is persuasive, it could be the case 
— as is everlastingly true in constitutional law — that the doctrine 
itself stands in need of revision. A handful of scholars, after all, 
believe the physical-testimonial distinction to be in need of full 
replacement.
157
 And many others believe that whatever doctrinal 
categories guide self-incrimination analysis, the Mind Reader 
                                                 
156
 See, e.g., Winnie Chan & A.P. Simester, Four Functions of Mens Rea, 70 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 381 (2011) (surveying the different reasons that we embed 
most crimes with an intentional aspect).   
157
 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4, at 344-45.  
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Machine serves essentially as a reductio argument against overly 
narrow interpretations. In response, this Part works one by one 
through the most common normative arguments against the Mind 
Reader Machine. By doing so, I demonstrate that none provides 
lasting grounds for an outright prohibition on mind reading, 
although some may militate in favor of limiting its use.  
One note before diving in: I have consciously shied away 
from normative arguments surrounding “reliability.” This is not 
because reliability concerns are non-existent or trivial – to the 
contrary, one could make a compelling case that reliability 
fundamentally grounds the Self-Incrimination Clause,
158
 and 
likewise a reasonable prediction that reliability will be what 
governs the use of Mind Reader Machines (or the equivalent) in 
practice.
159
 Rather, I refrain from addressing the issue of reliability 
for two distinct reasons. First, reliability issues permeate all types 
of evidence. As an analytical frame, therefore, reliability has 
nothing of specific interest to add to discussions of the Mind 
Reader Machine; nor is it responsive to the existing scholarly 
discussion of the Machine, which has pushed reliability issues to 
the margins in the rare instance that it has raised them at all. 
Second, in theory, reliability concerns plainly cuts both ways. It is 
easy to imagine a Mind Reader Machine that is detrimentally 
unreliable, but also easy to imagine a Mind Reader Machine that is 
far more reliable than other methods of extraction. Which way the 
arc bends in practice is an empirical question beyond the scope (or 
competency) of this Article.  
A. Concerns About Privacy 
 
The most powerful normative argument against the Mind 
Reader Machine is that its use would unduly encroach on 
individual privacy.
160
 This claim takes a variety of forms. Sarah 
                                                 
158
 See Amar & Lettow, supra note 11.  
159
 This is mainly what has guided the Court’s treatment of polygraphs and the 
like to date. See, e.g., Federspiel, supra note 15, at 870-72. And the discourse on 
reliability with respect to brain-imaging has already begun. See, e.g., J.R.H. 
Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why Neuroimaging-Based Lie Detection 
Requires a New Framework for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under 
FRE 702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2011) (discussing reliability 
concerns about brain-imaging as it relates to pretrial and trial admissibility).    
160
 N.B. For the purposes of this and upcoming sub-sections, I am putting to one 
side the Supreme Court’s disregard — or rejection — of the normative theories 
discussed. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) (“the 
Court has never on any ground, personal privacy included, applied the Fifth 
Amendment to prevent the otherwise proper acquisition or use of evidence 
which, in the Court’s view, did not involve compelled testimonial self-
incrimination of some sort.”). I aim to dissect them on a theoretical level.  
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Stoller and Paul Wolpe maintain that “technologies capable of 
uncovering cognitive information from the brain threaten to violate 
our sense of privacy in a new and profound way.”
161
 Robert 
Gerstein exhorts the importance, on privacy grounds, of allowing 
individuals to retain “control over information about 
[themselves].”
162
 Peter Arenella suggests that the “core value 
underlying the [self-incrimination] privilege's historical 
development” is that of “mental privacy.”
163
 Louis Michael 
Seidman submits that “[a]lthough a defendant who commits a 
crime may justly be punished and used by the state to deter others . 
. . his mental life remains private and immune from public 
coercion,” and that “compelled self-incrimination” is an example 
of such coercion.
164
 B. Michael Dann, in his famous article on self-
incrimination, draws reference to the “zone of privacy” 
safeguarded by the Self-Incrimination Clause.
165
 And most 
recently, Nina Farahany laments the “discomfiting fate” that would 
befall “a sphere of mental privacy” if the compulsory production of 
cognitive evidence were allowed.
166
  
These views are deeply intuitive. Who, after all, would not 
find the Mind Reader Machine invasive? Yet the constitutionally 
meaningful question is not whether the Machine would impinge on 
privacy — which it inescapably would — but whether that 
impingement would be cause for constitutional alarm, and if so, 
what kind of constitutional alarm. I believe that privacy-based 
arguments run up against two problems. The first is that they offer 
no way of distinguishing background mental states from higher-
order knowledge and belief. The second is that they mistake, for a 
Fifth Amendment problem, what is actually an issue of the Fourth.    
As for the first problem, suppose, arguendo, that “[t]he 
connection that we feel to our brain is unlike the connection that 
we feel to any other aspect of ourselves [because the brain] enables 
the consciousness that that we perceive as constituting the ‘self’ or 
‘I,’”
167
 or likewise that “mental control has normative significance 
because our thoughts are what anchor each of us as an individual 
                                                 
161
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 372.  
162
 Robert S. Gerstein, Privacy and Self-Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87, 89 (1970).  
163
 Peter Arenella, Schmerber and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: 
AReappraisal, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 32, 41 (1983).  
164
 Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the 
Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 97, 131 (1996). 
165
 B. Michael Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: 
Extorting Physical Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 604 
(1970).  
166
 Farahany, supra note 8, at 353.  
167
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 371.  
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person with an uninterrupted autobiographical narrative.”
168
 And 
suppose, furthermore, that these observations are strong enough to 
ground a constitutional privacy interest. Is there anything in these 
conceptions of “mental privacy” that can tell higher-order 
cognition (believe that, or knowledge of) apart from background 
mental states (like intoxication)? To answer this question, the 
privacy theorists propose an experiential rubric; they are 
concerned, quite explicitly, with the way one feels cognition to be 
important. Although it is possible to distinguish, say, my being 
agitated from my knowledge that a body is buried in my backyard 
on metaphysical or epistemological grounds,
169
 on experiential 
grounds, the task is considerably harder.  
But if the brain is, indeed, a constitutionally special domain 
of evidence, and the seizure of evidence from the brain would 
interfere unacceptably with “control over . . .  mental life,”
170
 I fail 
to see what distinguishes a desire to “control” feelings of agitation 
from a desire to “control” specific knowledge states. Any 
distinction would have to arise independently from concerns about 
mental privacy, and moreover, it would have to justify itself 
against concerns about mental privacy the other way. That is, a 
distinction would have to rationalize why background mental states 
are not worthy of protection, despite the desire for “control” that 
someone might feel toward them.
171
 And if background mental 
states are worthy of protection, advocates of mental privacy 
certainly bear the burden of demonstrating why something like a 
sobriety test, or a compulsory psychiatric evaluation, is not 
contemplated by their theory. 
The second problem is far more damning than the first. 
Namely, privacy-based theories conflate the location of seizure — 
the mind — with the essence of the thing seized. That a piece of 
evidence comes from a location regarded as private or sacred is not 
grounds, customarily, for erecting a substantive protection. It is, 
rather, grounds for erecting a procedural protection, exercisable by 
the individual from whom the evidence was seized, and designed 
to enforce certain standards of conduct among state actors. The 
identification of private or sacred space, in other words, goes to the 
                                                 
168
 Fox, supra note 5, at 796.  
169
 Cf. Michael S. Pardo, Self-Incrimination and the Epistemology of Testimony, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1023, 1034-35 (2008) (outlining the metaphysical 
problems with the physical-testimonial divide).   
170
 Fox, supra note 5, at 796. 
171
 See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989). 
Rubenfeld argues that on its own, the usual accounts of privacy — such as 
“autonomy” or “personhood” — provide scant grounds to resolve the line-
drawing problems endemic to liberalism. Conceptually, these invocations tend 
not to resolve the problem of governmental intrusion so much they restate it.  
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Fourth Amendment, not the Fifth.
172
 The natural analogy is to the 
home. Many people consider their homes to be sacred spaces – off 
limits, under normal circumstances, to state intrusion. In fact, 
many of our most sacrosanct privacy cases originate from 
intrusions into the home;
173
 and the salience of the home as a 




Nevertheless, the sacredness of the home has never been 
taken to justify a “substantive” protection,
175
 or a right of 
“control,”
176
 resulting in an absolute prohibition on evidentiary 
seizure. Instead, what the spatial sanctity of the home justifies is 
precisely robust constraints on evidentiary seizure – and this is true 
not in spite of but because of the seriousness of the underlying 
privacy concerns.
177
 So it is with cognitive evidence. The mind, 
like the home, is a place where seizures occur.
178
 And just as 
                                                 
172
 This is the view that Michael Pardo lays out in his article “disentangling” the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments. See Pardo, supra note 10 at 1860, 1878-80. 
(observing that “[b]oth Amendments regulate government attempts to gather 
information from citizens,” and that the self-incrimination privilege therefore 
“applies to a subset of events within the universe of potential Fourth 
Amendment events” and proposing a “two-step test” for applying the 
Amendments, the first to ask if the search or seizure was reasonable, the second 
to ask if it runs up against the self-incrimination privilege). Although I disagree 
— for reasons thoroughly documented above — with Pardo’s interpretation of 
the self-incrimination privilege, I agree with his architectonic view of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment. See also Amar & Lettow, supra note 11, at 920-21.  
173
 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that thermal 
scans of a home - to find evidence of marijuana growing - counts as a “search” 
for Fourth Amendment purposes); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) 
(holding that the government bears the burden of demonstrating exigent 
circumstances for a warrantless arrest in the home); Washington v. Chrisman, 
455 U.S. 1 (1982) (holding that government agents are prohibited in general 
from searching the home of an arrested suspect when the arrest is made outside 
the home). In a broad sense, Griswold also speaks to these themes. Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
174
 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, An Equilibrium Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 482-85 (2011); Orin Kerr, The Fourth 
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for 
Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 808-13 (2004); see generally Stephanie M. 
Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism and the Fourth 
Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (2010).  
175
 See Farahany, supra note 8, at 406. See also Arenella, supra note 163, at 42.   
176
 See generally Fox, supra note 5.  
177
 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (“This Court 
has never held that a federal officer may without warrant and without consent 
physically entrench into a man's office or home, there secretly observe or listen, 
and relate at the man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard.”) 
(emphasis added). Nor has it so held since. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.  
178
 See Pardo, supra note 10, at 1889 (“If one has an expectation of privacy 
anywhere, it is likely to be in the contents of one's own mind. Moreover, the 
Court has made clear that it is not necessary that for a search to occur there must 
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people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes, 
which imposes on the state the burden of establishing adequate 
grounds for a search, people have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to the content of their minds.
179
 Under 
standing Fourth Amendment doctrine, this expectation of privacy 
enacts important procedural safeguards. I operate under the 
assumption that the search and seizure of cognitive evidence, like 
the search and seizure of evidence from the home, would 
necessitate probable cause, either codified in the form of a warrant, 
or justified notwithstanding the absence of a warrant. What 
proponents of a substantive, privacy-based view of the Self-
Incrimination Clause want is to extend the protection of cognitive 
evidence (or a certain sub-category of cognitive evidence) beyond 
this procedural threshold. They want to cast its seizure as 
inherently unreasonable. That is, even assuming that cognitive 
searches would be subject to the usual Fourth Amendment 
strictures — and perhaps tighter strictures than usual, given the 
sensitivities of mental intrusion — the privacy theorists argue for 
something more robust still: an absolute prohibition.
180
 
The proposition motivating this call for “substantive” 
protection is, it seems, that certain domains are so private, and 
certain types of evidence so sacred, that searches of those domains 
or seizures of those types of evidence are never warranted, even if 
the criminal justice system suffers for it. This proposition is not 
without intuitive force. But taking a step back, what relationship 
does this proposition bear to our laws of criminal procedure? Only 
a few types of evidence — and no spatial domains — are 
substantively protected in this way, but it is not because the 
evidence is intrinsically sacred; it is because the evidence is 
privileged for reasons related to the social relationships they 
implicate. For example, the attorney-client privilege and the 
doctor-patient privilege are both justified in light of the incentives 
                                                                                                             
be a physical trespass or touching. Many Fifth Amendment events may qualify 
as seizures as well.”) (internal citations omitted). 
179
 Presumably one that covers both higher-order knowledge and belief and 
background mental states. I have not seen this issue addressed explicitly. But let 
us assume it for the sake of argument – it only makes my claim stronger. 
180
 It is notable that their proposals do not center on stricter elements for the 
issuance of warrants. This argument, it seems to me, would be considerably 
easier to defend. And as a practical matter, I will say that this seems like an 
enterprise of which we stand sorely in need. For one thing, because the doctrine 
is in shambles. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985) (calling the doctrine a “mass of contradictions”.). 
For another thing, its protections have eroded over time. See Jed Rubenfeld, The 
End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103-07 (2008) (showing ways in which 
Fourth Amendment protections, under the longstanding privacy-based regime, 
have effectively collapsed).  
47
Brennan-Marquez: A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013
A MODEST DEFENSE OF MIND READING 
 
 261 
they create, not any right to silence or privacy; absent such 
privileges, we fear that lawyers and doctors will be unable to 
effectively play their professional roles.
181
 The spousal privilege is 
more intricate because it seems grounded in something beyond 
sheer prudence. Although the spousal privilege does have certain 
valences to individual privacy, it is better understood to safeguard 
the integrity of the marital relationship as a whole. Two features, in 
particular, militate in this direction. First, in many jurisdictions, the 
privilege attaches to both spouses, not just the spouse facing 
prosecution, suggesting that it intends to protect the integrity of the 
union, not the privacy interest of one spouse or the other.
182
 
Second, under certain circumstances, the privilege can disappear 
— for example, in the context of a legal action between married 




In light of all that, what militates in favor of extending a 
substantive protection to cognitive evidence, given the absence of 
parallel protections in the rest of our evidentiary laws? The most 
interesting argument is Robert Gerstein’s claim that individuals 
have a right, in essence, to repent before God, a guarantee that can 
only be sustained in private, absent governmental intrusion. For 
Gerstein, “a man ought to have absolute control over the making of 
[certain] revelations,” such as “the admission of wrongdoing, the 
self-condemnation, the revelation of remorse.”
184
 These, in 
Gerstein’s view, “have generally been regarded as [matters] 
between a man and his conscience or his God, very much as have 
                                                 
181
 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (describing the 
privilege as codifying the proposition that ““sound legal advice or advocacy 
serves public ends and that such advice of advocacy depends upon the lawyer's 
being fully informed by the client””); see also In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 
Cherney, 898 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Buckley, 586 F.2d 
498, 502 (5th Cir. 1978) (both advancing similar policy rationales).  Another 
example of an evidentiary privilege with an obviously prudential cast is the 
privilege on evidence that involves state secrets or classified information. Cf. 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that, in general, 
privileges act as “exceptions to the demand for every man’s evidence” which 
“are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of 
the search for truth”).  
182
 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 83 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006) 
(noting that ““most jurisdictions now provide that both spouses hold the 
privilege””). Interestingly, this is not true as a matter of federal law. See 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (holding that only the 
testifying spouse holds the privilege).  
183
 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 182, at § 84  (outlining types of 
controversies in which the spousal privilege is generally inapplicable, including, 
inter alia, ““actions by one spouse against the other””); see also R. Michael 
Cassidy, Reconsidering Spousal Privileges After Crawford, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
339, 355-64 (2006) (outlining rationales for the privilege).  
184
 Gerstein, supra note 162, at 90.  
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been religious opinions. This . . . is a very important part of what 
lies behind the privilege against self-incrimination.”
185
 This 
argument is fecund and thought-provoking. As an anthropological 
musing about the cultural norms that undergird our constitutional 
system, I believe Gerstein’s account has much to offer. As a legal 
argument, however, it is unrecognizable. Nowhere in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, or in the surrounding commentary, has there been 
any whiff of possibility that Gerstein’s view should be doctrinally 
incorporated. However rich an explanatory account it may offer, 
his view makes no contact with the privilege’s actual operation.      
On the other hand, the more recognizably legal arguments 
are hardly more than a magic show. Nina Farahany claims that “[a] 
sphere of private rumination is essential to our fundamental 
concepts of freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of 
will and individual autonomy,” for reason of which we need 
“substantive [safeguards] to adequately protect mental privacy.”
186
 
Farahany offers no citations in defense of this view, nor does she 
make any attempt to show why “a sphere of private rumination” is 
more important to thought, expression, will, and autonomy than, 
say, a sphere of private existence in one’s home, or an expectation 
of not being arrested for no reason while walking down the street. 
Both of these are of course important to thought, expression, will, 
and autonomy, but in neither case does this entail — or even invite 
serious discussion of — an absolute privilege, or its analytical 
twin, a “substantive” protection.  
Sarah Stoller and Paul Wolpe, along with Dov Fox, mount 
similarly conclusory arguments about the centrality of cognition. 
Mental states, in their view, differ from other forms of evidence in 
how intimately they relate to personhood. According to Fox and 
Stoller and Wolpe, my brain and my mind are inextricable from 
my essential being in a way that my blood and DNA are not, and 
the forcible extraction of evidence from my brain therefore 
constitutes a different class of violation than the extraction of 
evidence from my blood.
187
 As Fox puts it, “our blood is readily 
separable from what we think important about us, whereas our 
thoughts are not,”
188
 and in Stoller and Wolpe’s words, “bleeding 
is something that “I” can watch or take note of,” whereas 
consciousness is not.
189
 Again, no effort is made to distinguish 
cognition, in this respect, from other domains to which we ascribe 
enormous value, and from which we extrapolate conceptions of our 
selfhood, but to which only a procedural right of privacy attaches. 
                                                 
185
 Id.  
186
 Farahany, supra note 8, at 406. 
187
 See Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 369-72; Fox, supra note 5, at 793-98. 
188
 Fox, supra note 5, at 796.  
189
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 371.  
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What is more, even if the foregoing accounts are correct, 
and the fulcrum of Fifth Amendment analysis truly is felt 
sacredness from the perspective of an individual compelled to 
produce evidence, bizarre consequences follow. Unless these 
scholars purport to speak for every person living subject to the 
laws of our Constitution — surely not — the argument must 
resolve into a subjective test about what individual people consider 
sacred. What if, for instance, I come from a culture that reared me 
to believe the essence of a person lies in his or her blood, and that 
depriving someone of control over his or her blood constitutes an 
egregious offense to personhood?
191
 Suddenly, Schermber would 
become problematic on the same grounds that Farahany, Fox, and 
Stoller and Wolpe want to problematize the Mind Reader Machine. 
I doubt, however, that we would pay this argument much regard. 
Nor do I think that anyone would be inclined to extend a 
substantive privacy protection to objects that embed religious or 
spiritual significance, or to objects with profound sentimental 
value. Such objects might be  experienced as “sacred” — whatever 
that quite means — and their seizure may well register as an acute 
violation. The question, however, is not whether sacredness 
describes phenomenological reality; it is whether (and how) 
sacredness bears on the criminal justice system.
192
 On that score, 
the commentary has fallen far short of persuasive. Indeed, even 
                                                 
190
 Notably, Stoller and Wolpe’s article concludes, as does Farahany’s, with a 
proposal for legislative reform – a hedge in case the Court breaks from their 
assessment of cognition as special. See Farahany, supra note 8, at 406; Stoller & 
Wolpe, supra note 4, at 375. In both cases, it is hard not to read the proposals as 
concessions of jurisprudential flimsiness.  
191
 As pluralists, we ought to account for this possibility, however strange it may 
seem. But even metaphysically — lest Farahany, Fox, and Stoller and Wolpe 
become too satisfied that Western philosophy militates in their favor — there 
exist strong reasons to regard the distinction between cognitive evidence and 
bodily evidence as fundamentally arbitrary. See, e.g., SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE 
FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 217-25 (2d ed. 1998).  
192
 On this front, apart from all its other shortcomings, the “felt sacredness” 
theory enjoys the distinct honor of not only muddying Fifth Amendment 
analysis, but also initiating new and untold First Amendment problems. If 
experience of the sacred were to become an alarm bell for self-incrimination, 
controversies about freedom of expression and the free exercise of religion 
would surely be quick to follow. Compare Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise clause permits states to prohibit 
the sacramental use of peyote) with Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that the Free Exercise clause prohibits states from 
proscribing animal sacrifices with religious significance).    
50
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Dov Fox’s article, to its credit, takes stock of the immense 
line-drawing problems that plague his “sacredness” view. The end 
of his article makes a few faint-hearted gestures toward resolution -
- for example: “[M]uch in modern political theory has devoted 
itself to the proposition that each person possesses rights over 
which considerations of the common good cannot take 
precedence,” from which it follows that “[w]orthy and serious 
though the goals of the criminal justice system are, they fail to 
outweigh the injury to the individual that is done when the state 
deprives a suspect of control over his mental life.”
194
 The trouble, 
of course, is that the state customarily encroaches on citizens’ 
liberty, privacy, and autonomy interests when a valid prerogative 
outweighs them – and far from being an aberration, this style of 
encroachment is going on everywhere, all the time.
195
 Criminal 
prosecution, furthermore, is no throwaway example. It is a lodestar 
example, second only to national security in terms of centrality to 
the state’s function. In fact, this is precisely why Fourth 
Amendment doctrine takes a procedural rather than substantive 
cast: its purpose is to modulate the inherent tension that arises 
between due process, on the one hand, and the administration of 
justice, on the other.
196
 This enterprise eschews categorical lines; it 
calls for contextual, not formal, analysis. Inasmuch, Fox’s 
observation about the delicate balance between “the goals of 
criminal justice” and the “[rights] each person possesses” is quite 
sound – but it cuts in favor of the opposite conclusion from the one 
he seeks to defend. It is precisely because the balance is so delicate 
that the vindication of privacy, when it comes to procuring 
evidence for criminal prosecution, lies in qualifications of context 




                                                 
193
 I have been focusing on the pitfalls of the privacy account with respect to the 
cognitive-physical distinction. But there is another problem as well: a 
substantive privacy right is extraordinarily difficult to square with the immunity 
exception to self-incrimination. If privacy is indeed animating concern behind 
the right to silence, it is odd — fatally odd — that we feel comfortable 
compelling testimony as long as the consequences are innocuous. See Stuntz, 
supra note 13, at 1232-34; Ronald Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination, 
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 729, 734 (2008).  
194
 Fox, supra note 5, at 800.  
195
 Cf. Allen, supra note 193, at 732.  
196
 See Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 174 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment acts as a membrane 
between individual and state that changes, as technologies change, in order to 
maintain the same basic balance of power).  
197
 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 4, at 344-45.  
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B. Guilt, Innocence, and the “Cruel Trilemma”  
 
The second normative tack against the Mind Reader 
Machine is to focus on the differentiation of guilt and innocence. 
This thread laces a variety of arguments, all addressed to how the 
self-incrimination privilege impacts criminal trials. Abstractly, the 
issues cut both ways. On the one hand, by hemming in the state’s 
ability to gather evidence, the privilege makes prosecutions more 
difficult and, on the margins, allows guilty parties to walk free. On 
the other hand, the privilege also serves as a loose “guarantee” 
against perjury — most importantly, against false proclamations of 
innocence — which helps, arguably, to keep guilt and innocence 
cleanly delineated.
198
 Against this bivalent backdrop, arguments 
surrounding guilt and innocence divide into two sets, one 
concerned with the impact of the privilege on guilty parties, the 
second with the impact on innocent parties. I address each set in 
turn. The upshot is that none of the arguments, whether motivated 
by concern for guilty parties or innocent parties, apply to the Mind 
Reader Machine, no matter how directly and urgently they might 
apply to other self-incrimination settings.  
1. Concern For Guilty Parties  
 
The first argument born of concern for guilty parties has to 
do with the state’s prosecutorial burden of proof. Namely, the 
government should bear the full burden of demonstrating that a 
criminal suspect is guilty — rather than forcing a suspect to 
demonstrate his innocence — and that use of the Mind Reader 
Machine would effectively flip this principle around. As for the 
basic claim about where the burden of proof lies, the Court has 
written, for instance, that “[among the] basic purposes that lie 
behind the privilege against self-incrimination [is] preserving the 
integrity of a judicial system in which even the guilty are not to be 
convicted unless the prosecution ‘shoulder the entire load.’”
199
 In a 
                                                 
198
 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 13.  
199
 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 415 (1966); Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 54-57 (1964) (outlining the role the Self-Incrimination 
Clause plays in modulating the relationship between individual and state during 
prosecutions); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961) 
(describing “the requirement that the state which proposes to convict and punish 
an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its 
officers”); see also Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405, 412-14 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the self-incrimination is partly to ensure 
that in criminal proceedings, the burden of proof not “shift” to become the 
defendant’s “laboring oar”). Cf. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 40 
(2000)  (noting that the Self-Incrimination Clause requires the state to bear the 
entire burden of proof in establishing the proper use of testimonial evidence).  
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similar vein, the Court has also lauded our “our accusatory system 
of criminal justice” for “demand[ing] that the government seeking 
to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its 
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient 
of compelling it from his own mouth.”
200
 In the abstract, however, 
this means quite little. The observation that the state must gather 
the evidence required to build its case — rather than relying on a 
defendant to produce it — does not resolve the question of what 
type of evidence is privileged. It begs that question.
201
 If the state’s 
evidence falls within the privilege’s scope, the state has failed to 
meet its burden by definition. In other words, inquiry as to whether 
the state has borne the “laboring oar” of prosecution just is inquiry 
about the bounds of the privilege.
202
  
The second argument born of concern for guilty parties is 
the widespread notion that the self-incrimination privilege protects 
suspects from facing a “cruel trilemma” of incrimination (in case 
of an honest confession), perjury (in case of a false proclamation 
of innocence), and contempt (in case of the decision to remain 
silent).
203
 Putting to one side the question of how “cruel” this 
decision really is,
204
 even if concerns over the “trilemma” do 
ground (or partially ground) the privilege against self-
incrimination under normal circumstances, they are inapposite to 
the Mind Reader Machine. Simply put, the trilemma is only cruel 
                                                 
200
 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 460).  
201
 See Geyh, supra note 64, at 612 (pointing out that in and of itself, the 
“presumption of innocence” rationale does not resolve any of the line-drawing 
problems).   
202
 Picking up where the Court’s flashpoint rhetoric leaves off, Michael Pardo 
has developed a much more sophisticated account of the “presumption of 
innocence” theory from the vantage point of epistemology. See Pardo, supra 
note 169. Pardo argues that prosecutions should begin from an “epistemic blank 
slate,” and that “[a]ttempting to compel the defendant to assume epistemic 
authority for incriminating propositions (or to assume epistemic authority for 
contrary propositions, which can then be attacked in order to suggest guilt) 
violates this initial [] presumption.” Id. at 1043-44. In Pardo’s view, this 
provides an epistemologically rigorous foundation for the distinction between 
testimonial and physical evidence – testimonial evidence being evidence that 
effectively “passes” the government’s epistemic burden to the defendant. Id. at 
1044. I agree. But this does not help to resolve the substantive question of what 
“testimony” means. If I read Pardo correctly, we agree on this point.  
203
 This point mainly appears in Court opinions. But it also has some support 
among scholars. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311 (1991); see also 
George M. Dery, Lying Eyes: Constitutional Implications of New Thermal 
Imaging Lie Detection Technology, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 217, 248 (2004) (arguing 
that the “cruel trilemma” framework applies to cognitive evidence by analogy). 
204
 I am not alone in my skepticism. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 193, at 732 n.16; 
Farahany, supra note 8, at 360.  
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— indeed, it only exists — insofar the criminal suspect faces a 
choice about whether to “stay silent” and, if not, what to say. 
Although the Mind Reader Machine could take any number of 
different forms, and each form (per my discussion in the last Part) 
might carry different substantive consequences for privilege, all 
forms of the Machine strip away a suspect’s volition. That is just 
the point. The Machine poses no “trilemma” for the just same 
reason that it would make for an effective interrogation device: in 
practice it minimizes, and in theory eliminates, room for deceit. 
The third argument born of concern for guilty parties is 
William Stuntz’s innovative “excuse” theory of the privilege.
205
 
This argument is conceptually similar to the “trilemma” argument, 
and it is inapposite to the Mind Reader Machine for the same basic 
reason. Stuntz’s argument is as follows. Insofar as our criminal law 
and procedure embeds the principle that “people should not be held 
to a standard higher than that which their judges can meet,” there is 
a strong case to be made that “[i]f even honest people would 
commit perjury when asked under oath to confess to criminal 
conduct, then a serious argument for excusing perjury in such 
cases would exist.”
206
 Yet for a variety of reasons, it does not make 
prudential sense to immunize perjury — most notably, that it 
would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system 
— so instead we immunize silence.
207
 Stuntz’s article is both 
elegant and descriptively forceful. However, because it examines 
the role of choice in the criminal justice system, his excuse theory 
runs orthogonal to the central problem of the Mind Reader 
Machine. As in the “trilemma” argument above, the whole point of 
Machine is that it removes a suspect’s choice. It is just as senseless, 
therefore, to talk about “excusing” a suspect’s refusal to submit to 
the Mind Reader Machine as it is to talk about “excusing” a 
suspect’s refusal to submit to a blood or DNA test – not because it 
is unimaginable that a person of average moral standing would 
want to avoid the Machine or the DNA tests, but because there is 
no act of perjury (or constructive perjury) to excuse. Stuntz himself 
made a similar point apropos of blood samples, “Since one cannot 
falsify physical characteristics such as blood, there is no falsehood 
to excuse and therefore no need to immunize noncooperation.”
208
 
The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the Mind Reader Machine.  
 
 
                                                 
205
 Stuntz, supra note 13. See also Farahany, supra note 8, at 364-66.  
206
 Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1229.  
207
 Id.  
208
 Id. at 1276.  
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2. Concern For Innocent Parties  
 
On the other side, the main defense of the privilege born of 
concern for innocent parties is Seidmann and Stein’s famous 
“game-theoretic” view.
209
 Against the intuition that the self-
incrimination privilege helps the guilty by barring certain types of 
inculpatory evidence, Seidmann and Stein maintain that it also 
helps the innocent by operating as an “anti-pooling device” on 
confessions.
210
 The argument hinges on four premises: (a) that for 
crimes that carry harsh penalties, a rationally acting guilty party 
would always claim to be innocent, even if doing so required 
perjury; (b) that most guilty parties are rational actors; (c) that the 
aggregate impact of false claims to innocence, past a certain 
threshold, will be to undermine fact-finders’ confidence in the 
veracity of true claims to innocence; and (d) that given the option 
of silence rather perjury, many rationally acting guilty parties 
would choose the former. From these premises, it follows that the 
right to silence helps to maximize the epistemic value of claims to 
innocence. Seidmann and Stein’s article made an intellectual 
splash upon publication and has since attracted a bevy of follow-up 
commentary, both laudatory and critical.
211
 Here, however, it is not 
necessary to address the inner workings of Seidmann and Stein’s 
view, because even assuming their view is correct, it cuts in favor 
of the Mind Reader Machine. Seidmann and Stein are centrally 
concerned with the systemic properties that make it easier or 
harder for fact-finders to accurately determine criminal liability. 
They are concerned, in other words, about ensuring that guilt and 
innocence are as sharply distinguishable as is practically possible. 
This aligns with the aim of the Mind Reader Machine.  
 
C. Coda: Mind-Body Dualism and its Discontents  
 
The final claim against mind-reading is not addressed to the 
Machine per se, but to the distinction between physical and 
testimonial evidence. A handful of scholars argue that the 
dichotomy, first articulated by Justice Brennan in Schmerber, has 
outgrown its cogence in the age of neuroscience. Dov Fox, for 
example, suggests that the “distinction between physical and 
testimonial evidence presupposes a flawed dualism between body 
and mind,” because it predicates the idea that only “mental (and 
                                                 
209
 See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 13.  
210
 Id. at 430-42.   
211
 For an overview of these responses and a substantive reply, see Alex Stein, 
The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1115 (2008). 
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not bodily) processes comprise communicative meaning.”
212
 Nita 
Farahany echoes this view, though in a less systematic form, in her 
discussion of the “conflict between emerging neuroscience and 
current self-incrimination doctrine.”
213
 Stoller and Wolpe do 
likewise in their discussion of “testimonial-like” evidence.
214
 
As a threshold matter, it is worth observing (a) that the 
Court has shown absolutely no interest in this type of metaphysical 
speculation, and (b) that law has no mandate, in principle, to justify 
itself to neuroscience. Putting those issues to one side, the deeper 
problem with these recent “deconstructions” of the physical-
testimonial distinction is that they rely on a substantive 
construction of “testimony,” which, for reasons already discussed, 
I believe to be wrongheaded. Evidence from the Mind Reader 
Machine only poses a middle-case — it is only “testimonial-like” 
— insofar as testimony refers to the aspect of evidence that records 
the content of cognition. If testimony refers, instead, to the act of 
communication required to produce evidence, ostensible middle 
cases cease to be, in the proper sense, “middle.” A piece of 
evidence is either produced by a communicative act or it is not. 
Evidence can only be “testimonial-like” — even in theory — if 
one begins from the assumption that testimony turns on content. If 
so, then we can imagine evidence as an alloy, composed of 
multiple parts, some of which are testimonial, others of which are 
physical. But this possibility evaporates once the fulcrum becomes 
communication – the presence of which is simply binary.
215
  
Ultimately, it is hard to avoid the somewhat cynical 
conclusion that invocations of neuroscience are more about 
rhetorical firepower than analytical force. The proposition that 
technological change has undone a doctrinal distinction is vogue 
and — if the adjective can be risked in an article about the Fifth 
                                                 
212
 Fox, supra note 5, at 793. Somewhat ironically, the upshot of Fox’s theory is 
that we need to retrench the line separating body from mind in order to bootstrap 
a theory of mental privacy. After taking apart the “mind-body dualism” that 
apparently plagues Justice Brennan’s view in Schmerber, Fox circles back and 
exhorts the importance of consciousness, as opposed to physicality, to “who we 
are.” One dualism is merely swapped for another.  
213
 Farahany, supra note 8, at 354.  
214
 Stoller & Wolpe, supra note 4, at 367.  
215
 The other problem with these arguments is that they end swapping one 
dualism for another – consciously or unwittingly, it is hard to say. In each 
account, the analytical purpose of pointing out the fallibility of the mind-body 
distinction is to carve out a space of increased protection for the mind. They 
want to maintain that (a) the mind-body distinction is incoherent, and (b) mental 
evidence deserves heightened protection, vis-à-vis bodily evidence, in virtue of 
the more acute privacy concerns it poses. It is not logically impossible to 
reconcile these two propositions. But it is not easy. Surely, at the very least, 
those who want to reconcile them bear the burden of proof, not the other way 
around.   
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Amendment — sexy. To be sure, there are examples of technology 
rendering previously workable legal categories unworkable. The 
law of searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, for 
example, has come under strain in the face of technologies like 
GPS.
216
 It is important, however, to distinguish between 
technologies that deconstruct law, on the one hand, and 
technologically complex scenarios that present difficult questions 
of law, on the other. GPS could be said to genuinely deconstruct 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, in the sense it divests the doctrinal 
anchor — reasonable expectations of privacy — of the purpose for 
which it was originally designed.
217
  
I do not think, however, that the same can be said of mind-
reading devices with respect to the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
They present hard questions of law, but nothing that pushes 
beyond the threshold of difficulty presented by other, non-
technological scenarios. Mind-reading devices, at least in their 
foreseeable form, occupy the same Fifth Amendment status as 
observation-only psychiatric evaluations. Both raise the same 
fundamental question about the extraction of cognitive evidence 
from an unwilling suspect. The legal issues are thorny in both 
settings, but the difference between them is factual, not conceptual: 
                                                 
216
 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the 
installation of a GPS-tracking device constitutes a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment). The inappositeness of existing doctrine made the Court’s 
treatment of the issue verge on comical. During oral argument, for example, the 
Chief Justice distinguished between GPS technology and so-called “beepers” 
(devices that allow police to track cars at a close distance) on the theory that the 
former require too little work from police. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 
United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259). How this can serve 
as the fulcrum of a constitutional distinction, I leave to the imagination of 
readers with more creative minds than my own. Ultimately, it seems to me that 
the lesson to be drawn from GPS-related controversies is that a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” framework, as well as the emphasis on discrete instances 
of “search,” simply cannot respond to a world where technology allows police to 
procure continuous streams of information, in real-time, almost anywhere in the 
world. Cell phone surveillance cases have raised similar issues – and have had 
similarly deconstructive effects. See RICHARD THOMPSON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42109, THE GOVERNMENT TRACKING OF CELL PHONES AND VEHICLES: 
THE CONFLUENCE OF PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LAW, 8 n.60 (Dec. 1, 2011); 
Note, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use of 
Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004) 
(outlining the difference between GPS-based tracking and triangulation-based 
tracking of cell phones). Just as in Jones, the lesson here is that extant paradigms 
of Fourth Amendment law make little sense when applied in these settings.  
217
 As though in tacit acknowledgment of this problem, the Court has taken to 
modulating the scope of Fourth Amendment privacy in response to 
technological change. See Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, supra note 174.  If Professor Kerr’s view is correct, it is 
evidence for the point I am making here: an example of how courts respond to 
the process of technology unraveling previous doctrinal distinctions.   
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for one, mind-reading devices have the capacity to reach different 
kinds of evidence than human observers; for another, mind-reading 
devices differ from human observers in the precision with which 
they extract information.
218
 The important point, however, is that 
while the physical-testimonial dichotomy is not easy to apply in 
this setting — in the same way that it is not easy to apply to 
observation-only psychiatric evaluations — it still makes 
conceptual sense. 
     
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has advanced three claims. First, the Court has 
consistently interpreted “testimony” in communication-based 
rather than substantive terms. Second, under a communication-
based view of testimony, certain uses of the Mind Reader Machine 
would likely be permitted, others would likely be prohibited, and 
either way, the determination would be contextual and technology-
specific. Third, existing doctrine, and thus my conclusions drawn 
from existing doctrine, stand up to normative scrutiny. 
Analytically, these claims are modest. In fact, they are noticeably 
modest. Boiled down to its essence, my argument is that the 
Court’s view of self-incrimination coheres, and that mind-reading 
should be analyzed the same way that any interrogation method — 
or, really, any legal question — is analyzed in our courts: carefully, 
using a scalpel rather than a sledgehammer.  
I have not argued, in other words, for an extreme position. I 
have argued for moderation against an extreme position – but it is 
an extreme position that enjoys near-universal favor. To date, the 
consensus against the Machine has verged on histrionic. Although 
almost every article published on the subject contains some 
discussion of the gradient of possible technologies to which its 
central indictment might apply, few have actually considered how 
differences in the underlying technology might change the way the 
doctrine plays out. This makes sense: the projects do not depart in 
search of nuance. They seek to draw categorical lines. But there is 
something puzzling in this. Why bother outlining the possible 
typologies of mind-reading, a discerning reader may well wonder, 
when the point is to impugn the whole enterprise?  
My approach has been just the inverse. Instead of offering a 
lush catalog of technologies, I have endeavored to craft a doctrinal 
argument in favor of paying greater attention to the subtle 
                                                 
218
 This, of course, could cut either way – it depends on the specific aspects of 
the relevant technology.  
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discrepancies among them. If you are persuaded that those 
discrepancies matter, I consider this Article a success.  
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